纵向垄断协议反垄断法规制的省思和调适:基于成本框架的分析

Reflection and Adjustment on Anti-Monopoly Law Regulation ofVertical Monopoly Agreements:Analysis Based on the Cost Framework

纵向垄断协议的反垄断法规制依循“原则禁止+双阶抗辩”的规制逻辑。在成本框架下,这一规制逻辑兼具信息成本移转和错误成本控制的双重目标。然而,纵向垄断协议反垄断法规制的成本框架既存在“双阶抗辩”应用难度较大的显性失灵,信息成本移转也引发了道德风险和“涅槃谬误”的隐性失灵。基于信息成本移转与错误成本控制之权衡,纵向垄断协议反垄断法规制成本框架调整的“较优解”应是在肯认“原则禁止”纵向垄断协议的基础上,通过实质化应用适当补强“双阶抗辩”的错误成本控制功能;“次优解”则是回归具体个案的事实考察,以期充分控制错误成本。

Anti-monopoly law regulation of vertical monopoly agreements follows the regulatory logic of “prohibition inprinciple plus two-stage defenses.” Under the cost framework,this regulatory logic has the dual goals of informationcost shifting and error cost controlling.However,the cost framework for anti-monopoly regulation of verticalmonopoly agreements is subject to the explicit failure of difficult application of the “two-stage defense” and theimplicit failure of moral hazard and the nirvana fallacy caused by the transfer of information costs.Based on thetrade-off between information cost shifting and error cost controlling,the optimal solution for adjusting the antimonopolyregulatory cost framework of vertical monopoly agreements should be to recognize the “prohibition inprinciple” of vertical monopoly agreements,and appropriately strengthen the “two-stage defense” throughsubstantive application.The suboptimal solution is to return to case-specific fact-finding in order to fully control theerror cost.