麦金太尔的美德伦理学:相对性或相对主义?--一种基于伽达默尔“第二等级的历史主义”的解读

McIntyre’s Ethics of Virtue:Relativity or Relativism--An Explanation Based on Gadamer’s“The Second-Degree Historicism”

麦金太尔的美德伦理学从确立之初就不时遭受“道德相对主义”的指摘,这让他不得不反复撰文阐释和修正自己最初的观点。伽达默尔诠释学同样被施特劳斯用历史主义和相对主义所责难,可以说,他们二人的历史主义思想和对相对主义责难的回应有着诸多一致之处。他们共同站在“第二等级的历史主义”立场上,用相对性来对抗相对主义,并强调具体历史背景对于理解的先验性。在此种意义上,麦金太尔并非一位道德相对主义者,他从“第二等级的历史主义”出发区分了“参与者”和“旁观者”,继而在确保个人拥有“善良意志”的同时以更高层次的“相对性”打开了获得普遍道德真理的大门,这种真理观是一种诠释学意义上的开放真理观。

Macintyre’s ethics of virtue has been criticized by“moral relativism”from time to time since its establishment,which has compel him to explain and revise his original views repeatedly.Gadamer’s hermeneutics was also criticized by Strauss with historicism and relativism.It can be said that there are many similarities between their historicism and their responses to relativism.They stand on the position of“the second-degree historicism”,using relativity to fight relativism and emphasizing the apriority nature of specific historical background for understanding.In this sense,McIntyre is not a moral relativist.He distinguishes“participants”and“bystanders”from“the second-degree historicism”,and then opens the door to universal moral truth with a higher level of“relativity”while ensuring that individuals have“good will”.This view of truth is an open view of truth in the sense of hermeneutics.