摘要
边缘计算激励机制可以激励用户参与到资源分配的过程中来.为防范不诚实用户对资源分配的操纵,现有激励机制致力于使参与者在投标时给出他们的真实估值,但未考虑对假名攻击的对抗策略.为解决现有机制缺乏对抗假名攻击的能力这一问题,首先,对假名攻击投标决策手段进行分析,设计了假名过滤算法和结合边缘服务器成本的最小临界值定价算法,假名过滤算法剔除可能的假名用户,定价算法则保证了假名用户无法通过操纵临界价格提高效用.然后,证明了该防假名拍卖机制满足真实性和个体理性,此外还证明了该机制对假名攻击具有抗操纵性.实验结果表明,该机制能够在满足真实性的同时,保证用户无法通过单方面发起假名攻击增加效用.
Edge computing incentive mechanism can encourage users to participate in the process of resource allocation.In order to guard against dishonest users from manipulating the resource market,existing incentive mechanism aims to enable participants to give their true valuation when bidding,but does not consider the countermeasures against false-name attacks.To solve the problem that the existing mechanism lacks the ability to resist False-name-proof attacks.First,by the analysis of the decision-making means of bid under false-name attacks,False-name filtering algorithm and the minimum critical pricing algorithm combined with the edge server cost are designed.False-name filtering algorithm eliminates possible pseudonym users,and pricing algorithm ensures that False-name users cannot improve their utility by manipulating the critical price.Then,prove that False-name-proof Auctions Mechanism is truthful,individually rational and robustness for false-name attacks.The experimental results show that mechanism can ensure that the user cannot increase the effectiveness by unilaterally launching a false-name attack while ensuring the truth.
作者
张震东
付晓东
刘骊
彭玮
ZHANG Zhendong;FU Xiaodong;LIU Li;PENG Wei(Faculty of Information Engineering and Automation,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650500,China;Yunnan Key Laboratory of Computer Technology Application,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650500,China)
出处
《小型微型计算机系统》
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第5期1046-1053,共8页
Journal of Chinese Computer Systems
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(61962030)资助
云南省中青年学术和技术带头人后备人才培养计划项目(202005AC160036)资助。
关键词
边缘计算
资源分配
组合拍卖
防假名拍卖
edge computing
resource allocation
combinatorial auction
false-name-proof auctions