面向边缘计算资源分配的防假名拍卖机制

False-name-proof Auctions Mechanism for Resource Allocation in Edge Computing

边缘计算激励机制可以激励用户参与到资源分配的过程中来.为防范不诚实用户对资源分配的操纵,现有激励机制致力于使参与者在投标时给出他们的真实估值,但未考虑对假名攻击的对抗策略.为解决现有机制缺乏对抗假名攻击的能力这一问题,首先,对假名攻击投标决策手段进行分析,设计了假名过滤算法和结合边缘服务器成本的最小临界值定价算法,假名过滤算法剔除可能的假名用户,定价算法则保证了假名用户无法通过操纵临界价格提高效用.然后,证明了该防假名拍卖机制满足真实性和个体理性,此外还证明了该机制对假名攻击具有抗操纵性.实验结果表明,该机制能够在满足真实性的同时,保证用户无法通过单方面发起假名攻击增加效用.

Edge computing incentive mechanism can encourage users to participate in the process of resource allocation.In order to guard against dishonest users from manipulating the resource market,existing incentive mechanism aims to enable participants to give their true valuation when bidding,but does not consider the countermeasures against false-name attacks.To solve the problem that the existing mechanism lacks the ability to resist False-name-proof attacks.First,by the analysis of the decision-making means of bid under false-name attacks,False-name filtering algorithm and the minimum critical pricing algorithm combined with the edge server cost are designed.False-name filtering algorithm eliminates possible pseudonym users,and pricing algorithm ensures that False-name users cannot improve their utility by manipulating the critical price.Then,prove that False-name-proof Auctions Mechanism is truthful,individually rational and robustness for false-name attacks.The experimental results show that mechanism can ensure that the user cannot increase the effectiveness by unilaterally launching a false-name attack while ensuring the truth.