期刊文献+

Game Theory based Optimal Defensive Resources Allocation with Incomplete Information in Cyber-physical Power Systems against False Data Injection Attacks

原文传递
导出
摘要 Modern power grid is fast emerging as a complex cyber-physical power system(CPPS)integrating physical current-carrying components and processes with cyber-embedded computing,which faces increasing cy-berspace security threats and risks.In this paper,the state(i.e.,voltage)offsets resulting from false data injection(FDI)attacks and the bus safety characterization are applied to quantify the attack consequences.The state offsets are obtained by the state estimation method,and the bus safety characterization considers the power net-work topology as well as the vulnerability and connection relationship of buses.Considering the indeterminacy of attacker’s resource consumption and reward,a zero-sum game-theoretical model from the defender’s perspective with incomplete information is explored for the optimal allocation of limited defensive resources.The attacker aims to falsify measurements without triggering threshold alarms to break through the protection,leading to load shedding,over-voltage or under-voltage.The defender attempts to ensure the estimation results to be as close to the actual states as possible,and guarantee the system’s safety and efficient defensive resource utilization.The proposed solution is extensively evaluated through simu-lations using the IEEE 33-bus test network and real-time digital simulator(RTDS)based testbed experiments of the IEEE 14-bus network.The results demonstrate the effec-tiveness of the proposed game-theoretical approach for optimal defensive resource allocation in CPPS when lim-ited resources are available when under FDI attacks.Index Terms—Optimal strategy,game theory,Nash equilibrium,CPPS,FDI attack.
出处 《Protection and Control of Modern Power Systems》 SCIE EI 2024年第2期115-127,共13页 现代电力系统保护与控制(英文)
基金 supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China(No.2023YFB 3107603) the“Pioneer”and“Leading Goose”R&D Program of Zhejiang(No.2022C01239) the Special Support Plan for Zhejiang Province High-level Talents(No.2022R52012) the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.52177119) the Funda-mental Research Funds for the Central Universities(Zhejiang University NGICS Platform).
  • 相关文献

参考文献2

二级参考文献14

共引文献8

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部