共同机构所有权与客户集中度

Common Institutional Ownership and Customer Concentration

高客户集中度加大了公司经营风险和供需链断裂可能性,这显然不利于“国内国际双循环”发展格局的构建。本文利用2007-2021年中国上市公司数据,从理论和实证上分析了共同机构所有权对公司客户集中度的影响。研究发现,共同机构所有权通过提高公司议价能力和信息透明度来降低过高客户集中度,且其联结程度越高、联盟数量越多,降低效果越明显。进一步分析发现,当企业主要客户出现业绩下滑或经营不善时,共同机构所有权才会发挥协同监督效应以干预企业客户集中度,且该效应的发挥在西部地区公司和非高新技术公司中更显著。本文为降低企业对单一大客户依赖程度、加强政府相关部门在企业客户资源配置优化管理方面的作用提供了政策启示。

High customer concentration increases the operational risk and the likelihood of supply chain disruptions,which is obviously detrimental to the construction of the“domestic and international dual circulation”development paradigm.This paper theoretically and empirically analyzes the effects of common institutional ownership(CIO)on firms’customer concentration,using the data of Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2021.The paper finds that CIO reduces excessive customer concentration by enhancing firms’bargaining power and information transparency,and the higher the association degree and the greater the number of alliances,the more significant the reduction effect.Further analysis reveals that CIO only exerts a synergistic supervisory effect to intervene in a firm’s customer concentration when the firm’s major customers experience performance decline or poor management,and this effect is more significant among companies located in the Western region and for non-high-tech companies.This paper provides policy insights for reducing enterprises’dependence on single major customers and strengthening the role of relevant government departments in optimizing the management of enterprise customer resource allocation.