摘要
培育壮大集成电路产业联盟,对提升关键软硬件技术创新和供给能力有重要影响。通过三方演化博弈方法,对“链长”“链主”和其他盟员三方作用下集成电路产业联盟创新行为的稳定性发展规律进行研究,并运用数值仿真分析论证了模型的有效性。研究发现:成本补贴变化、“链主”企业违约后所获得的机会收益、“链长”对盟员合作行为给予奖励以及“链长”对违约方的惩罚变化均对产业联盟的稳定性产生一定影响。据此,以期拓宽主体发展空间,提高产业竞争力,引导产业链转型升级,为强链补链提供更多的方法依据。
Cultivating and expanding integrated circuits has an important impact on improving the technological innovation and supply capacity of key software and hardware.Based on the three-party evolutionary game method,the stable development law of innovation behavior in integrated circuit industry alliances under the influence of"chain leader","chain master",and other allies was studied,and the validity of the model was demonstrated through numerical simulation analysis.It is found that the change of cost subsidy,the opportunity income obtained by the"chain owner"enterprise after default,the reward given by the"chain leader"to the cooperative behavior of the alliance members,and the change of the punishment of the"chain leader"to the defaulting party all have a certain impact on the stability of the industrial alliance.Based on this,in order to broaden the development space of the main body,improve industrial competitiveness,guide the transformation and upgrading of the industrial chain,and provide more methods and basis for strengthening and supplementing the chain.
作者
李冰
马翠廉
LI Bing;MA Cui-lian(China Center for Information Industry Development,Beijing 100081,China)
出处
《技术经济与管理研究》
北大核心
2024年第5期24-31,共8页
Journal of Technical Economics & Management
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(21AZD084)
国家社会科学基金重大项目(23&ZD136)。
关键词
产业联盟
集成电路
链长
链主
收益分配
Industrial alliance
Integrated circuit
Chain leader
Chain master
Income distribution