不利天气下考虑公司利他偏好的农产品供应链补贴机制

Government Subsidy Mechanism of Agricultural Products Supply Chain by Considering Company Altruism Preference Under Adverse Weather

在不利天气影响农产品产量的情况下,考虑财政预算约束和公司利他偏好,构建无政府补贴、产出补贴、收购补贴、一次性补贴公司和一次性补贴农户五种情形下的博弈模型,比较不同政府补贴方式对农产品供应链最优决策的影响,并从改善消费者剩余和社会福利、提高资金使用效率三方面分析政府的最优补贴策略.研究表明:每种补贴方式都能提高农产品供应链系统利润、改善社会整体福利,且政府补贴能有效增强利他偏好对农户努力水平的提升作用.进一步,当补贴资金不受财政预算约束时,收购补贴和产出补贴都能发挥资金杠杆作用;且从改善消费者剩余和社会整体福利角度,收购补贴为最优补贴策略;从补贴资金使用效率角度,产出补贴为最优补贴策略.当补贴资金受财政预算约束时,仅一次性补贴公司能发挥资金杠杆作用,且一次性补贴公司总是优于一次性补贴农户.

Under adverse weather affecting output of agricultural products,this paper considers financial budget constraint and altruism preference to set game models in five cases:Non-government subsidy,product subsidy,purchase subsidy,one-time subsidy to company and one-time subsidy to farmer.The study compares the influence of different subsidy methods on the optimal decision-making of agricultural products supply chain and analyzes government 's optimal subsidy strategy from three perspectives:Consumer surplus,overall social welfare and subsidy capital efficiency.Research shows that when government implements subsidy to agricultural products supply chain,it can always improve the utility of farmer and overall welfare of society,and government subsidy will enhance the promotion impact of altruism preference on the farmer's effort.Furthermore,when the financial budget is abundant,implementing product subsidy and purchase subsidy always provides leverage;Purchase subsidy is the optimal strategy in terms of improving overall social welfare and consumer surplus,and product subsidy is the optimal strategy in terms of capital subsidy efficiency.When the financial budget is insufficient,one-time subsidy to company can provide leverage.Both from consumer surplus and overall social welfare and from capital subsidy efficiency,one-time subsidy to company is always better than one-time subsidy to farmer.