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最优物流运输服务采购拍卖机制

Optimal Auction Mechanism of Logistics and Transportation Service Procurement
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摘要 在物流运输服务交易市场,二级市场不断增长,导致供应商面临关联价值的信息结构。关联价值模型允许竞拍者根据其他竞拍者的信息估价,挑战传统私人价值信息结构下的交易机制。文中设计了关联价值情境下的最优运输服务组合拍卖机制,以促使真实信息提交。该机制满足激励相容性与个体理性,允许投标人充分表达其偏好,降低托运人采购成本。理论分析表明该机制有效,实验证实能降低采购成本。 In the logistics and transportation service transaction market,the continuous growth of the secondary market has led suppliers to face an information structure characterized by interdependent values.The interdependent value model allows bidders to estimate values based on others information,challenging transaction mechanisms established under the traditional private value information structure.This paper introduces an optimal transportation service combination auction mechanism tailored for the interdependent value scenario to encourage the submission of genuine information.The mechanism ensures incentive compatibility and individual rationality,enabling bidders to fully express their preferences and reducing procurement costs for consignors.Theoretical analysis indicates the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism,and empirical results demonstrate its capability to reduce procurement costs.
作者 王雅娟 彭畅 WANG Ya-juan;PENG Chang(School of Management,Wuhan University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430081,China)
出处 《物流工程与管理》 2024年第5期9-12,共4页 Logistics Engineering and Management
关键词 物流运输采购 关联价值 组合拍卖 拍卖机制 logistics and transportation procurement interdependent value combination auction auction mechanism
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