委托代理理论视域下高校自设交叉学科政策执行研究:偏差、成因及治理机制

Research on the Implementation of Policies for Interdisciplines Set Up Autonomously by Universities from the Perspective of Principal-Agent Theory:Deviations,Causes and Governance Mechanisms

源于经济学的委托代理理论为分析高校自设交叉学科政策执行提供了启发性视角。委托代理理论视域下,高校自设交叉学科政策的委托人与代理人之间存在利益冲突和信息不对称。政策执行中的自由裁量权和信息过滤、政策委托人对代理人激励不足、委托人对政策执行监督乏力等致使高校在执行交叉学科设置相关政策过程中出现偏差,具体表现为政策的选择性执行、替换性执行以及象征性执行等。借鉴委托代理理论,治理高校自设交叉学科政策执行偏差,可从以下几个方面入手:加强顶层设计,构建交叉学科设置的规范机制;优化建设环境,完善政策执行激励机制;深化横向监督,健全政策执行监督机制。

The“principal-agent”theory derived from economics provides an inspiring perspective for analyzing the implementation of interdisciplinary policies.Under the perspective of principal-agent theory,there are conflicts of interest and information asymmetry between the principal and the agent of interdisciplinary policy.Discretion in policy enforcement and information filtering,insufficient incentives for policy“principals”to“agents,”and the difficulty of principals to supervise effectively lead to policy implementation deviation.Specific manifestations include selective implementation,alternative implementation and symbolic implementation of policies.Referring to the principal-agent theory,the ways to mitigate the policy implementation deviation are as follows.First,strengthen top-level design and build a normative mechanism for interdisciplinary settings.Second,optimize the construction environment and improve the policy implementation incentive mechanism.Third,deepen horizontal supervision and improve the policy implementation supervision mechanism.