理性主体的黄昏——笛卡尔的理性主体和尼采的挑战

The Dusk of Rational Subjects:Descartes’Concept of Rational Subject and Nietzsche’s Challenge

由于首次不设任何前提而讨论自我,笛卡尔开启了西方哲学史上对自我的真正讨论。在笛卡尔哲学中,自我即“我思”,而我思的本质是理性主义的主体概念,即理性主体。也是从笛卡尔开始,“自我作为理性主体能够认识真理”的观点深入人心,对后世的科学发展和社会变革起了巨大的推动作用,并成为理性主义传统的重要组成部分。本文将尝试说明,理性主体概念与笛卡尔的我思概念同一,并且在其身心二元立场下具有三个特征,分别是:(1)主体是精神实体,(2)主体意味着行为和选择的自主性,(3)主体意味着一种先天统一性;而尼采所提出的一套非理性主义哲学通过对身心二元的弥合,有力地挑战了笛卡尔的理性主体概念。

Because of discussing the self without any premises for the first time,Descartes initiated a true discussion of the self in the history of Western philosophy.In Cartesian philosophy,“self”refers to“Cogito”,and the essence of“Cogito”is the subjective concept of rationalism,that is,the rational subject.Starting from Descartes,the viewpoint of“the self as a rational subject can understand truth”deeply rooted in people’s hearts,played an essential role in promoting scientific development and social change in later generations,and became an important component of the rationalist tradition.This article will attempt to explain that the concept of rational subject is the same as Descartes’concept of“Cogito”and has three characteristics in its dual position of body and mind:1st,the subject is a spiritual entity;2nd,the subject implies autonomy in behavior and choice,and 3rd,the subject implies an innate unity;Yet the irrational philosophy proposed by Nietzsche effectively challenges Descartes’concept of rational subject by bridging the duality of mind and body.