契约约束和政府激励下生鲜电商供应链绿色投资合作行为演化博弈分析

Research on the Evolution of Green Investment Cooperation Behavior Decision-making in Fresh Food E-commerce Supply Chain under Contract Constraints and Government Incentives

针对消费者对线上优质绿色生鲜农产品的巨大需求,构建由生鲜电商和冷链物流企业组成的生鲜电商供应链绿色投资合作行为决策演化博弈模型。分别研究在契约约束和政府激励下,考虑不同参数变化对双方行为选择的影响。为验证理论的准确性做了数值仿真。研究结果表明:双方或单方是否会进行绿色投资,与绿色投资收益率息息相关。系统双方的均衡策略,随着绿色投资收益率的变化而变化。同时,搭便车现象的存在,会抑制双方的绿色投资。政府激励能促使双方绿色投资,具体体现为:期初时政府采取绿色投资补贴效果快速显著,政府的绿色投资奖励基金更具可持续性,两种方式协同激励效果最优。研究结果对政府制定激励策略和供应链参与主体绿色投入具有一定启示。

Consumers have huge demand for online high-quality green fresh agricultural products.An evolutionary game model of green investment cooperation between fresh produce e-commerce platforms and cold chain logistics companies was constructed.Under the contract constraints and government incentives,the effects of different parameter changes on the behavior choices of both parties are studied respectively.Numerical simulation was performed to verify the accuracy of the theory.The results show that either parties or unilaterally will make green investment is closely related to the rate of return of green investment.The equilibrium strategy of both sides of the system changes with the change of green investment rate of return.At the same time,the existence of free-rider phenomenon will inhibit the green investment of both parties.Government incentives can promote green investment on both sides.The government's green investment subsidies have instant and remarkable effects while the government's green investment incentive fund will be more sustainable.The two approaches can produce optimal synergistic incentive effects.The research results have certain implications for the government to formulate incentive strategies and supply chain participants'green investment.