摘要
毫无疑问,“力”取代了“灵魂”“原因”等旧形而上学概念,是近代运动学说的关键概念。然而,近代机械论将“力”作为物体因碰撞而发生的相互“作用”,这实际上回避了对运动之原因的追问,而仅限于从数学上描述并且预测运动的过程。莱布尼茨也接受这一物理学意义上的“力”,但其更专注于动力学的形而上学基础,而这一基础就是其所构建的实体学说。因而,莱布尼茨凭借实体之知觉的“表象”来界定“力”。如此一来,莱布尼茨就赋予了“力”这一概念以新的形而上学意蕴,并且还借此重新统摄为机械论所割裂的“现象界”与“本体界”。可以说,莱布尼茨的“力”具有本体论的地位,因而是通向其形而上学体系的一条隐秘路径。
There is no doubt that“force”has replaced the old metaphysical concepts such as“soul”and“cause”and has become a key concept of the modern doctrine of motion.However,modern mechanics treats“force”as the mutual“action”of bodies due to collisions,which in fact avoids the question of the cause of motion and limits itself to mathematically describing and predicting the process.In this regard,Leibniz also accepted this“force”in the physical sense,but focused more on the metaphysical foundation of dynamics,which is the doctrine of substance that he constructed.Thus,Leibniz defined“force”by virtue of the“representation”of the perception of substance.In this way,Leibniz gave a new metaphysical meaning to the concept of“force”and was able to reunite it with the“phenomenal world”and the“ontological world”that had been severed by mechanism.It can be said that Leibniz’s“force”has an ontological status and is therefore a hidden path to his metaphysical system.
作者
李志龙
LI Zhilong(Research Center for Chinese Ethical Civilization,Hunan Normal University,Changsha 410081,China)
出处
《中南大学学报(社会科学版)》
北大核心
2024年第3期1-11,共11页
Journal of Central South University:Social Sciences