数字化转型与企业集团决策权配置

Digital Transformation and Allocation of Decision Rights in Business Groups

决策权配置对企业集团的生存与发展具有重要意义。在数字经济时代,企业集团的数字化转型将深刻改变决策权配置模式。本文构建理论模型并使用A股上市公司2011—2021年数据实证检验了数字化转型对企业集团决策权配置的影响。研究发现:数字化转型显著降低了企业集团决策权的集中度,促使决策权向子公司转移。在使用工具变量、DID以及PSM等多种稳健性检验方法后,主要结论仍然成立。渠道分析表明:数字化转型通过降低企业集团面临的不确定性以及降低子公司与母公司间的相对信息成本两条途径促使决策权向子公司转移。此外,数字化转型促进分权的效应在民营、子公司数量更少和子公司承担业务量更轻的企业集团中表现更为明显。本文的研究对公司治理具有重要意义,为数字时代企业集团决策权配置提供了理论与经验支撑。

The allocation of decision rights holds significant implications for the survival and development of business groups.In the digital era,the digital transformation of business groups will profoundly alter the pattern of decision rights allocation.This paper proposes a model and empirically examines the impact of digital transformation on decision rights allocation within business groups.We develop aprincipal-agent model to analyze the influence of digital transformation on decision rights within business groups.In the model,the parent company acts as the principal,determining the allocation of decision-making,while the subsidiary acts as the agent responsible for productive inputs throughout the project.Compared to the subsidiary,the parent company exhibits greater risk aversion.Therefore,allocating decision rights to the parent company would result in efficient decisions but insufficient incentives for the subsidiary.Conversely,allocating decision rights to the subsidiary would provide efficient incentives but may lead to inefficient decisions.We posit that the impact of digital transformation on decision rights within business groups is mediated by uncertainty and relative information costs:digital transformation provides business groups with more information and enhances their ability to process and analyze information,thereby reducing uncertainty and prompting them to allocate decision rights to the subsidiary.Furthermore,the empowering effect of digital transformation is asymmetric,with a greater empowerment for the subsidiary compared to the parent company,resulting in lower information costs for subsidiary decision-making and thus driving business groups to allocate decision rights more to the subsidiary.Based on the model,we use data from A-share listed companies from 2011to 2021to validate its inference.The baseline results indicate that digital transformation significantly reduces the concentration of decision rights within business groups,prompting its transfer to subsidiaries.After conducting endogeneity and robustness tests using various methods such as instrumental variables,difference-in-differences(DID),and propensity score matching(PSM),the conclusion that“digital transformation reduces the concentration of decision rights within business groups”remains valid.Further mechanism analysis indicates that digital transformation promotes the transfer of decision rights to subsidiaries through two channels:by reducing uncertainty faced by business groups and lowering the relative information costs between subsidiaries and the parent company.In the heterogeneity analysis,we find that the decentralization effect facilitated by digital transformation is more pronounced in privately-owned business groups with fewer subsidiaries and lighter business volumes.Compared with existing literature,this paper contributes in the following aspects:Firstly,at the theoretical level,by introducing uncertainty and relative information costs,it discusses the specific mechanism through which digital transformation affects decision rights allocation within business groups,thereby extending the existing research on digital transformation.Secondly,at the empirical level,based on data from Chinese A-share listed companies,it validates the viewpoint that information technology drives the decentralization of decision rights,enriching the relevant research on organizational authority.