动态竞争下考虑混合医生类型的互联网医疗平台医疗服务定价

Healthcare Service Pricing for Internet Healthcare Platform Considering Mixed Doctor Types Under Dynamic Competition

互联网医疗平台动态设置医疗服务价格以平衡供需并开展竞争。在互联网医疗平台动态竞争下,考虑全职医生和兼职医生混合参与,运用最优控制理论,分别在患者资源、医生资源和双边资源竞争场景下,构建了医疗平台医疗服务动态定价模型。结果表明,竞争对手设置的医疗服务价格能正向作用于互联网医疗平台最优医疗服务价格,且这种作用强度随着平台中兼职医生感知收益的增加而减弱。在医疗服务需求衰减场景中,这种作用强度随时间演进而减弱。在医疗服务需求激增和供需平衡场景中,这种作用强度随着医生资源竞争度和竞争对手收益分成比例的增大而加强。大规模雇佣兼职医生有助于互联网医疗平台为患者市场提供低价医疗服务。

The internet healthcare platform(IHP)dynamically sets healthcare service prices to balance supply and demand and keep competition.Considering the mixed participation of full-time doctors and part-time doctors under the dynamic competition of IHPs,the healthcare service dynamic pricing model of the IHP was constructed under the scenarios of competing patient resources,doctor resources,and bilateral resources respectively by utilizing the optimal control theory.Results indicate that the healthcare service price set by the competitor can positively affect the optimal healthcare service price of the IHP,and this effect strength decreases with the increase of perceived revenue of part-time doctors in the platform.In the scenario of healthcare service demand declining,the strength of this effect will decrease with operation time.In scenarios of the healthcare service demand surge and the supply-demand balance,the strength of this effect will be enhanced as the competition degree for doctor resources or the profit-sharing ratio of the competitor rise.The large-scale employment of parttime doctors can help the IHP to provide low-price healthcare services for the patient market.