基于演化博弈的民航危险品运输培训监管

Civil aviation dangerous goods transportation training supervision based on evolutionary game

为促进民航危险品运输培训精准监管,提升民航监管效能,实现合规培训与监管的最佳局面,进一步保障航空运输安全。首先从行为交互和微观经济学的角度,运用演化博弈方法,构建危险品运输培训机构和民航局双方演化博弈模型,定量分析博弈双方行为策略选择的情境条件及形成原因;然后运用MATLAB软件对重要参数的敏感性进行数值仿真分析,探讨受训者能力不足造成不安全事件概率、查处成功率、处罚力度和监管成本4个重要参数对系统演化路径及结果的影响效应;最后从管理层面对民航危险品运输培训监管提出有针对性的建议及措施。结果表明:受训者能力不足造成不安全事件概率、查处成功率和处罚力度3个参数对博弈双方行为选择具有正效应,而监管成本对博弈双方行为选择具有负效应。

To promote the accurate supervision of civil aviation dangerous goods transportation training, improve the efficiency of civil aviation supervision, realize the best situation of compliance training and supervision, and further ensure the safety of aviation transportation, from the perspective of behavioral interaction and microeconomics, the evolutionary game method is used to construct the evolutionary game model between the training institutions of dangerous goods transportation and the Civil Aviation Administration.The situational conditions and reasons for the selection of behavioral strategies of the two parties in the game are quantitatively analyzed.The sensitivity of important parameters is numerically simulated and analyzed by using MATLAB software.The influence of four important parameters on the evolution path and results of the system is discussed, including the probability of unsafe events caused by the insufficient ability of the trainees, the success rate of supervision, the penalty, and the supervision cost.Finally, targeted suggestions and measures are put forward from the management level in the face of the supervision of civil aviation dangerous goods transportation training.The results show that the 3 parameters of the probability of unsafe events caused by the insufficient ability of the trainees, the success rate of supervision, and the penalty have a positive effect on the behavior choice of both sides of the game, while the supervision cost has a negative effect on the behavior choice of both sides of the game.