考虑多元行为策略的地方政府大气治理四维演化博弈分析

Four-dimensional Evolutionary Games Analysis for Local Governments Atmospheric Governance Considering Multiple Behavioral Strategies

地方政府兼具权威性和地域性优势,被视为大气污染治理的主体力量,其行为选择直接影响治理成效。本文通过构造二元组改进经典演化博弈方法,刻画地方政府消极治理、属地治理和协同治理的多元行为策略,建立地方政府区域大气污染治理行为的四维演化博弈模型,进而分析系统稳定状态及演化轨迹,并重点探讨不同因素对协同治理关系的影响。研究结果表明:直接治理成本和协同增量成本都会对协同治理关系产生负向影响,并且协同增量成本的负向影响两倍于直接治理成本;直接治理收益和协同加成收益都会对协同治理关系产生正向影响,并且直接治理收益的正向影响是线性稳定的,而协同加成收益的正向影响会边际递减;地方政府之间的生态补偿不一定有利于协同治理关系,只有加强监督,提高抽查概率,生态补偿才能真正发挥促进作用。

Atmospheric pollution governance has experienced three stages including negative governance,local governance and collaborative governance.The systematic air protection policy was not formulated and the attitude of air pollution control was negative in early days due to the lack of awareness of air protection.With the promulgation of"Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law"in 1987,the territorial governance model was formed.The governance idea of regional air pollution joint prevention and control was formally proposed in 2010 to solve the regional and compound air pollution which territorial governance is unable to deal with and the related work has also been continuously promoted in recent years.Local governments are regarded as the main force of air pollution control because of their authority and regionality.The effectiveness of atmospheric governance is directly affected by their behavioral choices.By constructing a binary group to improve the classi-cal evolutionary game method,local governments'multiple behavioral strategies including negative governance,territorial governance and collaborative governance are depicted.Taking local government 1 as an example,the binary group is denoted as(w,),where w represents the probability of local government 1 actively controlling air pollution,represents the probability of it participating in coordination between governments,0<w<1,0<r<1.Accordingly,the probability of local government 1 choosing collaborative governance is uc,the probability of choosing territorial governance is zw(1-a)and the probability of choosing passive governance is 1-w.The binary group(1,1)corresponds to collaborative governance,(1,O)corresponds to territorial governance,and(O,α)corresponds to passive governance.On this basis,a fourdimensional evolutionary game model of local governments in regional air pollution control is established,the system stability state and evolutionary trajectory are analyzed and the impacts of different factors on the collaborative governance relationship are mainly discussed in this paper.The results show both direct governance cost and collaborative incremental cost have a negative impact on collaborative governance relationship,and the negative impact of collaborative governance cost is greater than that of direct governance cost.Both direct governance benefit and collaborative addition benefit have a positive impact on collaborative governance relationship,and the positive impact of direct governance benefit is linearly stable,while that of collaborative addition benefit will decrease marginally.Ecological compensation between local governments is not necessarily conducive to collaborative governance relationship.Only by enhancing supervision and improving the probability of random inspection can ecological compensation really play a promoting role.