外部选择与大国在国际组织中的非正式治理

Outside Options and Informal Governance in International Organizations by Major Powers

大国可通过正式规则和非正式渠道向国际组织施加影响力。正式规则通常表现为拥有更多的投票权。然而,更多的投票权往往不能保证大国促成符合其偏好的决策。为实现政策目标,大国可能寻求通过正式规则之外的非正式渠道对国际组织决策施加影响,从而实施非正式治理。自身具备有利的外部选择并且其他国家不具备有利的外部选择,是大国在国际组织中实施非正式治理的条件。国际组织的治理能力大幅增强会削弱其他国家的外部选择优势,使拥有有利外部选择的大国获得实施非正式治理的条件。当具备实施非正式治理的条件时,大国可以通过非正式治理获得更大的影响力。通过对美国在国际能源署、日本在亚洲开发银行和美国在国际移民组织中的治理行为分析,上述理论解释得到实证支持。

Major powers can exert influence on international organizations through formal rules and informal channels.Formal rules are usually manifested in the greater share of voting power.However,greater voting power cannot guarantee that major powers could promote decisions that are consistent with their preferences.To achieve their policy goals,major powers may seek to exert influence on international organizations'decision-making through informal channels in addition to formal rules,thus instituting informal governance.The availability of favorable outside options and the absence of favorable outside options for other states are conditions for major powers to implement informal governance in international organizations.A significant increase in the governance capacity of international organizations can weaken the advantage of outside options of other states,and therefore provides the conditions for the major powers with favorable outside options to implement informal governance.When the conditions for implementing informal governance are present,major powers can gain greater influence through informal governance.The above theoretical explanation is empirically supported by the case studies of the governance behaviors of the United States in the International Energy Agency,Japan in the Asian Development Bank,and the United States in the International Organization for Migration.