市场结构、地方保护与异常审计费用

Market structure、local protection and abnormal audit fees

构建公平有序的市场体系需要厘清市场垄断和地方保护对审计契约的影响。以沪深两市2015-2022年的上市公司为研究样本,实证检验市场结构集中度对异常审计费用的影响,进一步考察地方保护对审计契约的调节效应。研究发现:(1)市场结构集中度对异常审计费用具有显著负向影响,而地方保护进一步增强负向关系;(2)在异常审计费用为负时市场结构集中度和地方保护对异常审计费用的影响更显著,而年报问询函外部监督效用受地方保护制约;(3)市场结构集中度通过代理成本和审计时长影响异常审计费用,进而损害会计信息的稳健性和可比性。

This paper empirically examines the effect of market structure concentration on abnormal audit fees and further investigates the moderating effect of local protection on audit contracts,using listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2015-2022 as the research sample.This paper finds the following:First,market structure concentration has a significant negative effect on abnormal audit fees,and local protection further enhances the negative relationship.Second,the effects of market structure concentration and local protection on abnormal audit fees are more significant when the abnormal audit fees are negative,and the utility of external supervision of the annual report inquiry letter is constrained by local protection.Third,market structure concentration affects abnormal audit fees through agency costs and audit length,which in turn impairs the robustness and comparability of accounting information.This paper not only enriches the research related to market structure concentration and CPA audit,but also provides ideas that can be applied to transform local government functions,regulate low-cost audit competition and improve corporate governance.