代码共享协议选择非合作-合作两型博弈模型

Noncooperative-cooperative biform game models of the code sharing agreement choice

代码共享是航空公司之间一种普遍的有效合作方式,而达成代码共享协议是代码共享机票定价以及代码共享航空公司获利的前提.由于自由销售代码共享协议与利润共享机制缺乏相关研究,本文着重研究了利润共享机制下自由销售代码共享协议优化选择问题.首先提出了辐条模型可以更贴近地描述现实中乘客对航空公司的偏好,其次构建一种融通非合作博弈与合作博弈于一体的非合作-合作两型博弈模型.在非合作博弈部分,航空公司从各自角度出发考虑所有可能的代码共享协议,即形成各种竞争局势;在合作博弈部分,代码共享航空公司通过机票联合定价可分得利润,而竞争局势需要根据航空公司所得利润才能进行比较.所构建的非合作-合作两型博弈模型的显著特点包括:在非合作博弈部分航空公司无法事先估计其在各种竞争局势下的利润,而在不同竞争局势下合作博弈部分的最大航空联盟是不同的,且任意航空子联盟具有外部性.针对最大航空联盟有可能分裂的情形,本文利用Shapley值与两步Shapley值作为合作博弈部分的利润分配方法.通过数值实验,验证了所建非合作-合作两型博弈模型与解法的有效性,并从对比结果中可以发现,利润共享机制下自由销售代码共享协议具有显著优势,特别是在只包含一家较知名航空公司的航空市场中.研究成果可为优化代码共享协议选择与提升社会总福利提供重要理论与方法支持.

Code sharing is a common and effective cooperation among the airlines,and reaching a code sha-ring agreement is an essential precondition for pricing code sharing tickets and making profits from these tick-ets.Because there is few study on the free-sale code sharing agreement and the profit-sharing mechanism,this paper focuses on the optimal choices of the free-sale code sharing agreement under the profit-sharing mecha-nism.Firstly,this paper proposes the spoke model to describe the passengers'preferences for different air-lines in the reality.Secondly,a noncooperative-cooperative biform game model is constructed which integrates the noncooperative game with the cooperative game.In the noncooperative game part,the airlines consider all the possible code sharing agreement from their own perspectives,which means that all the available competi-tive situations are taken into account.In the cooperative game part,the code sharing airlines can share the profit of the grand coalition by joint-pricing for tickets,and the competitive situations formed in the noncooper-ative game part are compared according to the airlines'profits obtained in the cooperative game part.The re-markable features of the noncooperative-cooperative biform game include:The airlines'profits are unpredicta-ble in each competitive situation of the noncooperative game part,the grand coalitions of the cooperative game part may vary from one situation to another,and any sub-coalitions have externalities.Combining the most likely spitting process of joint pricing coalitions,the Shapley value and the two-step Shapley value are used as the allocation methods in the cooperative game part.Furthermore,the numerical experiments verify the effi-ciency of the proposed models and the solution method.The comparison results show that the free-sale code sharing agreement under the profit-sharing mechanism has some advantages,particularly in aviation markets where only one airline is more famous than others.Therefore,this paper provides significant theoretical and methodical supports to optimize the choices of the code sharing agreements and to improve the total social wel-fare in the aviation market.