事实转向与理由基础

The Factual Turn and the Foundation of Reasons

英美知识论近期出现一种所谓“事实转向”的思想趋向,它反对的主要目标是内在主义的思想。事实转向的出现曾被归结为来自三个方面的影响:麦克道尔的析取论;威廉姆森的《知识及其限度》,其核心主张“知识优先”意味着诉诸事实性;丹西的只有事实才能够是行动或信念的好的理由的“实践的实在论”。不过,事实转向存在如下的问题:一是在当今科学创造的时代,突出想象的、构造性的认识方式,应当更符合时代的需要。二是威廉姆森的“只相信你所知道的”说法,是一种理想化的说法。实际上在面临所知不足的状况下,我们往往只能先相信,然后进一步去寻找证据来确证。三是就认识与事实的关系而言,单有事实是不够的,事实是需要解读与把握的。四是威廉姆森的“证据等于知识(E=K)”说可能会遇到问题。

A trend that has emerged in British and American epistemology recently is the so-called“factual turn”,which is directly against internalism.The emergence of this turn has been attributed to the influences from the following three aspects:McDowell’s disjunctivism,Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits,whose essential idea of“knowledge first”means resorting to factuality,and Dancy’s“practical realism”in which only facts can be good reasons for action or belief.This article raises the following objections to the factual turn.First,in the era of scientific creation today,the ways of knowing that highlight imagination and construction are supposed to be more in line with the needs of the times.Second,Williamson’s statement of only believing what you know is an idealization.In effect,when having insufficient knowledge,we often can only believe first and then further look for evidence to confirm.Third,as far as the relationship between knowledge and facts is concerned,facts alone are not enough,as they need to be explained and grasped.Fourth,Williamson’s theory of“evidence equals knowledge(E=K)”may encounter challenges.