信用收益视角下购买工程质量安全险的演化博弈研究

Evolutionary Game Study on Project Quality Safety Insurance Purchase from the Perspective of Credit Benefits

从信用收益视角研究建设单位和施工单位之间购买工程质量安全险的策略选择问题。构建建设单位和施工单位的演化博弈模型,分析双方稳定策略的博弈过程。采用系统动力学仿真实验对该模型进行多情景模拟分析,从而长期探讨有利于建筑信用市场发展的稳定策略。研究结果表明:建设单位和施工单位购买工程质量安全险与其投入产出比有关系。在长期演化过程中,由于信用收益的驱动,建设单位趋向于购买工程质量安全险。

The strategy choice for purchasing project quality safety insurance between the contractor and the constructor was studied from the perspective of credit benefits.An evolutionary game model of the contractor and the constructor was constructed to analyze the game process of two parties’stabilization strategies.The system dynamics(SD)method was used to analyze the model in multiple scenarios to explore the long-term stabilization strategy conducive to the development of the construction credit market.The results showed that there is a relationship between the willingness of the contractor and the constructor to purchase insurance and the input-output ratio.In the long-term evolution process,the contractor was more inclined to purchase the insurance due to the drive of credit benefits.