考虑消费者行为和主播影响力的两阶段动态定价策略研究

A Two-stage Dynamic Pricing Strategy Research Considering Consumer Behavior and Anchor Influence

低质量产品制造商的“仿照定价”行为,极大地影响消费者对产品质量的判断,损害高质量产品制造商的利益,不利于行业、产业和企业的可持续发展。基于信号博弈理论,建立两阶段动态博弈模型,研究分离均衡和混同均衡下制造商的动态定价策略,并重点分析模仿效应和主播影响力对定价策略的影响。研究结果表明:高质量产品制造商可以通过向上调高或向下调低最优价格两种方式达成不同的分离均衡(a或b)。在模仿效应较小时,高质量产品制造商选择分离均衡b来阻止仿照定价行为;在模仿效应较大时,混同均衡则是更优的选择。若高质量产品制造商仅考虑分离均衡,在模仿效应最大时可以根据调整价格的特点选择分离均衡a或b。当制造商的两阶段定价仅存在一个模仿效应阈值时,模仿效应较小时应选择撇脂定价策略,模仿效应较大时应选择渗透定价策略;当存在两个模仿效应阈值时,模仿效应在两阈值之外时应选择撇脂定价策略,模仿效应在两阈值之间时应选择渗透定价策略。制造商的定价总是随主播影响力正向递增,这表明与更高影响力的主播合作的制造商可以获得更高的产品溢价空间。

The“imitation pricing”behavior of low-quality product manufacturers greatly affects consum-ers’judgment on product quality,damages the interests of high-quality product manufacturers,and is not con-ducive to the sustainable development of industries,industries and enterprises.Based on the signal game theory,a two-stage dynamic game model is established to study the dynamic pricing strategy of the manufacturer under the separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium,and the influence of imitation effect and anchor influence on the pricing strategy is analyzed.The results show that high-quality product manufacturers can achieve dif-ferent separation equilibriums(a or b)by raising the optimal price or lowering the optimal price.When the im-itation effect is small,high-quality product manufacturers choose to separate equilibrium b to prevent imitation pricing behavior;when the imitation effect is large,pooling equilibrium is a better choice.If the manufacturer of high-quality products only considers the separation equilibrium,the separation equilibrium a or b can be se-lected according to the characteristics of the adjusted price when the imitation effect is the largest.When there is only one imitation effect threshold in the two-stage pricing of the manufacturer,the skimming pricing strate-gy should be selected when the imitation effect is small,and the penetration pricing strategy should be selected when the imitation effect is large.When there are two imitation effect thresholds,the imitation effect should choose the skimming pricing strategy when it is outside the two thresholds,and the imitation effect should choose the penetration pricing strategy when it is between the two thresholds.The manufacturer’s pricing is al-ways positively increasing with the anchor’s influence,which indicates that manufacturers working with more influential anchors can obtain higher product premium space and profit from it.