摘要
机构共同持股是近年来资本市场频繁出现的现象,其是否会影响非金融企业的影子银行化活动是值得关注的重要话题。文章基于中国沪深A股非金融上市公司数据,探究机构共同持股对非金融企业影子银行化的影响。研究发现,机构共同持股显著抑制了非金融企业影子银行化;机制分析表明,机构共同持股主要通过缓解委托代理问题和促进实物投资等途径抑制非金融企业影子银行化;进一步分析发现,机构共同持股对非金融企业影子银行化的抑制作用在机构共同股东为压力抵制型组、机构共同持股时间长组以及国有企业组中更显著,相较于“信用中介”类影子银行,机构共同持股对“信贷链条”类影子银行的抑制作用更显著;经济后果分析发现,机构共同持股通过抑制非金融企业影子银行化显著降低了企业股价崩盘风险,提高了企业价值。研究结论不仅有助于深化对资本市场中机构共同持股现象的认识,而且能够为政府防范系统性金融风险和推动经济高质量发展提供微观依据和政策参考。
The real economy is the foundation of a great nation.However,in recent years,the structural contradiction between the rapid development of the virtual economy and the slowdown of the real economy has become increasingly prominent.More and more non-financial enterprises have been separating financial resources from their core businesses and engaging in shadow banking activities,leading to a serious"divergence from reality to virtual"in the economy.The Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China called for upholding the principle of serving the real economy in economic construction and preventing and resolving risks in the economic and financial fields.In this context,it has become an urgent issue to address how to restrain the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises,redirect finance back to the real economy,and promote high-quality economic development.This paper takes China's A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2020 as the research object to examine the impact and inherent mechanism of common institutional shareholding on the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises.The findings indicate that common institutional shareholding generally has a significant inhibitory effect on the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises.Mechanism analysis suggests that common institutional shareholding mainly suppresses the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises by alleviating agency problems and promoting physical investment.Further analysis reveals that,in the groups of pressure-resistant shareholders,longer duration of common institutional ownership,and stateowned enterprises,the inhibitory effect of common institutional ownership on the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises is more significant.Compared to shadow banks of"credit intermediary",common institutional ownership has a more significant inhibitory effect on shadow banks of"credit chain".In terms of economic consequences,the study shows that common institutional ownership increases the value of corporate stock prices by restraining the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises and reducing the risk of stock price collapse.This paper contributes to a better understanding of common institutional ownership in the capital market and provides valuable insights for policymakers in preventing systematic financial risks and promoting high-quality economic development.
作者
黄丹华
杜勇
马文龙
娄靖
Huang Danhua;Du Yong;Ma Wenlong;Lou Jing(College of Economics and Management,Southwest University,Chongqing 400715,China)
出处
《上海财经大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第2期3-17,共15页
Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“机构共同持股下的实体企业影子银行化同群效应:表征识别、驱动机理与经济后果”(72072146)
重庆市社会科学规划重大项目“西部陆海新通道沿线物流跨部门数字化协同监管体系研究”(2023ZDLH13)
重庆教委科学技术研究重点项目“工业互联网推动重庆市制造企业数字化转型的动力机制与制度创新研究”(KJZDK202300201)。
关键词
机构共同持股
影子银行化
实物投资
协同治理
common institutional ownership
shadow banking
physical investment
collaborative governance