绩效目标、官员特征与地方政府PPP项目投资偏好

Performance Goals,Official Characteristics,and Local Government Investment Preferences in PPP Projects

PPP模式是公共服务供给的新方式,在我国推广应用的过程中,经济性PPP项目和社会性PPP项目在数量和投资额上都呈现出结构失衡特点。基于激励视角,本文选取Wind数据库2014-2019年地方政府发起的PPP项目进行实证分析,从微观层面探究地方政府绩效目标和官员特征对PPP项目投资偏好的影响。研究发现,绩效目标对社会性PPP项目投资偏好具有显著负向影响,官员任期与社会性PPP项目投资偏好存在正相关关系。官员特征在绩效目标与PPP项目投资偏好之间发挥调节效用,即随着官员年龄和任期的增加,绩效目标对社会性PPP项目投资偏好的负面影响逐渐减弱。本文丰富和拓展了官员内外部激励如何影响地方公共服务供给的相关研究,为解释不同类型PPP项目分布差异现象以及促进PPP模式均衡有序发展提供了经验证据和理论依据,同时证实了传统晋升锦标赛理论的有限性。

The PPP is a new way of public service provision,and in the process of application in China,the distribution of PPP projects shows structural imbalance characteristics,with the number of economic PPP projects significantly more than social PPP projects.Based on the political incentive perspective,this study selects PPP projects initiated by local governments from 2014-2019 in Wind database for empirical analysis to explore the influence of local government performance goals and officials'characteristics on investment preferences of PPP projects at the micro level.The results of the study show that performance goals have a significant negative effect on investment preferences for social PPP projects,and official tenure has a positive relationship with investment preferences for social PPP projects.Official characteristics play a moderating role between performance goals and PPP project investment preferences,i.e.,the negative effect of performance goals on social PPP project investment preferences gradually diminishes as officials'age and tenure increase.This study enriches and expands the research related to how internal and external incentives of officials affect local public service provision,enriching and expanding the research related to how internal and external incentives of officials affect local public service provision,while confirming the limitation of the traditional promotion tournament theory.