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地方政府债务扩张与企业并购

Local Government Debt Expansion and Corporate M&A
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摘要 2008年全球金融危机爆发后,地方政府债务规模持续扩张引起高度关注,其对企业的影响成为重要的研究领域。本文以并购为视角,基于手工搜集整理的全口径地方政府债务数据进行实证检验,研究发现:第一,地方政府债务规模的扩张会抑制企业的并购行为,具体表现为降低并购概率、并购频率且缩小并购规模;第二,由地方政府债务扩张导致的企业融资约束加剧、风险承担能力降低和投资机会减少是造成上述负面影响的重要机制;第三,上述影响在非国有、融资需求大、高管风险偏好程度低和非市政相关行业的企业中更为显著;第四,进一步研究发现,地方政府债务扩张会降低企业的长期并购绩效。本文的研究结论不仅深化了地方政府债务扩张对企业资源配置效率影响的认识,还能够为防范化解重大金融风险与加强地方政府债务治理提供实践指导和证据支持。 After the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008,the continuous expansion of local governmentdebt has attracted high attention,and its impact on enterprises has become an important research field.At the same time,the motivation and influencing factors of enterprise merger and acquisition(M&A),an important investment decision ofenterprises,have become a research hotspot in recent years.In terms of the transitional economies represented by China,the M&A decision of enterprises is not entirely based on their development requirements,but is usually subject to themacro external environment.Previous research has confirmed that local governments have an important impact onenterprise M&A activities.Therefore,it is of great significance to investigate the impact of local government borrowingon the M&A decision of enterprises in a region and its mechanism.Based on this,this paper empirically examines theimpact of local governments’debt expansion on enterprise M&A by using the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A‐sharelisted non‐financial companies from 2008 to 2019 and the manually collected local government debt data at the provinciallevel as samples.This paper finds that the expansion of local government debt significantly inhibits enterprise M&A,which is reflected in reducing the M&A probability,frequency and scale.Mechanism analysis reveals that localgovernment debt inhibits enterprise M&A by increasing corporate financing constraints,and reducing enterpriserisk‐taking and corporate investment opportunities.In particular,when an enterprise is non‐state‐owned,with greaterfinancing demand,lower risk preference of the executives,or in industries unrelated to municipal fields,the impact oflocal government debt on enterprise M&A will be more significant.Further analysis shows that the expansion of localgovernment debt reduces the M&A performance of enterprises,and reduces the cross‐industry M&A and cross‐locationM&A of enterprises.Compared with existing research,the marginal contributions of this paper are mainly reflected in the following aspects.Firstly,based on the institutional background of China,this paper uses the hand‐collected full‐caliber provincial‐levelgovernment debt data to clarify the impact of local government debt on corporate M&A,which is helpful to deepen thecognition of the impact of local government debt on corporate M&A.Secondly,based on theoretical analyses andmultiple empirical tests,this paper provides evidence of the causal relationship for the impact of local government debtexpansion on corporate M&A decisions,which is helpful to understand the economic consequences of local governmentdebt and the necessity of governing local government debt.Thirdly,from the perspective of local government debt,thispaper reveals the macro factors that enterprises may consider when implementing M&A,which can not only providereference for the management of enterprises to make scientific M&A decisions,but also help deepen the cognition of theregulatory authorities on the microeconomic consequences of local government debt expansion.The conclusions of thispaper not only deepen the understanding of the impact of local government debt on the resource allocation efficiency ofenterprises,but also provide practical guidance and evidence support for preventing and defusing major financial risks andstrengthening the governance of local government debt.The policy implications of this paper are as follows.Firstly,enterprises should understand the macro institutional en‐vironment when initiating M&As,and have a preliminary judgment of the risks they may face in each link,so they canmore fully weigh the pros and cons.Secondly,it is necessary to deepen the reform of the local government debt manage‐ment system,prevent and defuse local government debt risks,and create a good production and operation environmentfor micro subjects.Thirdly,it is necessary to adhere to the financial market serving the real economy,improve the effi‐ciency of credit resource allocation,and reduce the financing difficulty and cost of the real sector.Fourthly,it is necessaryto improve the profitability of the real economy,increase the investment opportunities of micro subjects,and promote therealization of the synergy effect of M&As.
作者 吴育辉 莫一帆 WU Yuhui;MO Yifɑn(Xiɑmen University,Xiɑmen,China)
出处 《经济学动态》 北大核心 2024年第4期70-91,共22页 Economic Perspectives
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目“人口结构变化、劳动力雇佣与公司财务政策”(72372138) 中央高校基本科研业务费(20720201064)。
关键词 地方政府债务扩张 并购重组 融资约束 风险承担 投资机会 Local Government Debt M&A Financing Constraints Risk‐taking Investment Opportunities
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