监管问询与并购商誉减值规避

Regulatory Inquiries and the Avoidance of Goodwill Impairment in Mergers and Acquisitions

本文考察并购重组问询对商誉减值规避的影响。研究发现,并购中商誉风险高的交易更容易收到并购重组问询函,同时公司会通过商誉减值规避来应对并购重组问询的压力。问询强度越大,公司越重视,公司商誉减值规避行为也越明显。从作用机制来看,并购重组问询引起机构投资者和分析师等外部主体关注,增加了公司的业绩压力,从而导致公司商誉减值规避行为。异质性检验的结果表明,在收到并购重组问询函后,有“洗大澡”动机、国有企业以及会计信息透明度高的公司,其商誉减值规避行为明显更轻。本文的研究发现符合印象管理理论,为监管机构强化对商誉的监管提供了理论依据和现实启示。

This study investigates the impact of merger and acquisition(M&A)comment letters on the avoidance of goodwill impairment.The study finds that the M&A transaction with higher goodwill risk is more likely to receive M&A comment letters and at the same time,the company tends to engage in the avoidance of goodwill impairment in response to the pressure from receiving M&A comment letters.The greater the inquiry intensity,the more attention the company pays and the more pronounced the company’s behavior in the avoidance of goodwill impairment.From the perspective of the mechanism,M&A comment letters draw attention from external parties,such as institutional investors and analysts,which increases the performance pressure of the company,thereby leading to the avoidance of goodwill impairment.The results of heterogeneity tests indicate that companies with motives to“take a big bath,”state-owned enterprises,and companies with high transparency of accounting information exhibit significantly less behavior in the avoidance of goodwill impairment after receiving M&A comment letters.The findings of this study comply with the theory of impression management and provide a theoretical basis and practical insights for regulatory agencies to strengthen the regulation on goodwill.