“宽仁者慎微”:ESG表现与过度负债企业的杠杆收敛

Mixing Leniency with Caution:ESG Performance and Over-indebted EnterprisesMixing Leniency with Caution:ESG Performance and Over-indebted

过度负债是影响企业可持续发展的重要话题,但却鲜有研究关注ESG表现在抑制企业过度负债方面的影响及机理等问题。本文基于利益相关者理论和资本结构动态权衡理论,研究ESG表现如何影响过度负债企业的杠杆调整。结果表明:通过内部委托代理和外部信号传递渠道,提升ESG表现可以显著降低过度负债企业的杠杆水平,而金融市场化环境、企业产业性质和行业属性对该过程产生异质性影响;从调整方式来看,ESG表现良好的企业倾向于采用增权而非减债的方式降低债务水平,并抑制“短债长用”。研究丰富了过度负债企业杠杆调整影响因素和ESG表现经济后果的相关研究,为企业全面推广ESG理念提供相应启示。

Over-indebtedness is an important issue that affects the sustainable development of enterprises,but few studies have focused on the impact and mechanism of ESG performance in curbing excessive enterprise debt.Based on the stakeholder theory and the dynamic trade-off theory of capital structure,this paper examines how ESG performance affects the adjustment of leverage levels at over-indebted enterprises.The results show that enhancing ESG performance can significantly reduce the leverage level of over-indebted firms through internal principal-agent and external signaling channels,while the financial marketization environment,the nature of the firm's industry,and industry attributes have a heterogeneous impact on the process.Firms with a good ESG performance tend to reduce their debt level through shareholding adjustments rather than direct reduction of debt.This will also tend to inhibit the long-term use of short-term debt.The findings of this study enrich the related research on the leverage adjustment influencing factors and economic consequences of ESG performance of over-indebted enterprises,and provide corresponding insights for enterprises to comprehensively promote ESG concepts.