期刊文献+

图博弈的比例分离解及其在区域大气污染治理中的应用

The Proportional Split-off Solution for Graph Games and Application in Regional Air Pollution Control
原文传递
导出
摘要 近年来,环京津地区的大气污染治理问题一直是国家重点关注的环境问题,治理成本的分摊机制是解决该地区大气污染问题的关键.聚焦环京津地区大气污染联合治理问题,结合各城市的地理位置,采用具有图结构合作博弈(简称图博弈)模型进行研究.首先,将经典合作博弈中的比例分离解推广到图博弈中,提出了图博弈的比例分离解;其次,基于一致性公理探讨了图博弈比例分离解的公理刻画问题.随后,将图博弈的比例分离解应用于环京津地区的大气污染治理的成本分摊问题中,并通过实际算例以及与其他分配规则的对比分析,探讨了图博弈比例分离解的合理性. In recent years,the control of air pollution in Beijing-Tianjin area has always been the Environmental issues of national priority,and the cost allocation mechanism is the key to solve the air pollution problem in this region.This paper focuses on the joint control of air pollution around Beijing and Tianjin,and adopts the cooperative game model with graph structure(graph game)based on the geographical location of each city.Firstly,the proportional split-off solution of the classical cooperative game is extended to graph game,and the proportional split-off solution of graph game is proposed.Secondly,based on the axiom of consistency,this paper discusses the axiom characterization of proportional split-off solution of graph games.Then,the proportional split-off solution of graph game is applied to the cost allocation problem of air pollution control in Beijing-Tianjin area,and the rationality of the proportional split-off solution of graph game is discussed through practical examples and comparison with other allocation rules.
作者 顾雯玮 张广 GU Wen-wei;ZHANG Guang(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)
出处 《数学的实践与认识》 北大核心 2024年第5期46-56,共11页 Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金 国家自然科学基金青年项目(71901145) 上海市哲学社会科学规划青年课题(2019EGL010)。
关键词 大气污染治理 比例分离解 图博弈 公理刻画 air pollution control proportional split-off solution graph game axiomatization
  • 相关文献

参考文献6

二级参考文献42

  • 1赵来军,李怀祖.流域跨界水污染纠纷税收调控管理模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2004,12(5):144-148. 被引量:13
  • 2赵来军,李旭,朱道立,李怀祖.流域跨界污染纠纷排污权交易调控模型研究[J].系统工程学报,2005,20(4):398-403. 被引量:29
  • 3杜娜,曹东,杨慧芬.工业企业大气污染治理费用函数的研究[J].科学技术与工程,2007,7(6):1116-1118. 被引量:9
  • 4Halkos G E. Optimal abatement of sulphur in Europe[J]. Environmental and Resource Economics, 1994, 4: 127-150.
  • 5Halkos G E. Sulphur abatement policy: Implications of cost differentials[J]. Energy Policy, 1993, 1: 1035-1043.
  • 6Halkos G E. Incomplete information in the acid rain game[J]. Empirica, 1996, 23: 129-148.
  • 7Krawczyk J B. Coupled constraint Nash equilibria in environmental games[J]. Resource and Energy Economics, 2005, 27: 157-181.
  • 8Dinar A, Howitt R E. Mechanisms for allocation of environmental control cost: Empirical tests of acceptability and stability[J]. Journal of Environmental Management, 1997, 49: 183-203.
  • 9Petrosjan L, Zaccour G. Time consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction[J]. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2003, 27: 381-398.
  • 10Nir B, Easter K W. Water diversion from the Great Lakes: Is a cooperative approach possible?[J]. Water Resources Development, 1997, 13(1): 53-65.

共引文献72

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部