员工参与战略配售、新股定价与长期业绩表现——基于科创公司的证据

Employee Participation in Strategic Placement,IPO Pricing,and Long-term Performance:Evidence from Sci-tech Innovation Companies

注册制改革后,作为一项重大制度创新,员工被允许参与新股的战略配售,本文检验了科创公司员工参与战略配售对新股定价和上市后长期表现的影响。研究发现:员工参与战略配售的公司,其IPO新股回报率显著更高。回报率较高的原因是员工参与配售提升了首日收盘价(二级市场溢价),而非降低了发行价(一级市场抑价)。员工参与战略配售的公司,上市后的会计业绩和市场表现更佳,表明新股质量更高。进一步分析表明,新股定价效应受员工获配份额高低的影响,与员工未参与战略配售的公司相比,员工配售获配份额较低的公司一级市场抑价程度显著更低,而获配份额较高的公司一级市场抑价程度更高。原因可能是份额较低的公司员工参与的主要目的是传递积极信号,以提升发行价;而份额较高的公司为了让员工分享上市红利,主动调低了发行价。本文的结果表明,科创上市公司可以通过员工参与配售提升新股定价效率,让员工分享上市红利。

Following the registration system reform,employees have been offered the opportunity to participate in the strategic placement of new shares(referred to as Employee Participation hereafter).The objective of Employee Participation is to enhance the rationality of issuance pricing.While prior studies have extensively explored the signaling role of intermediary institutions in the Initial Public Offering(IPO)process,there is a notable absence of examination regarding these internal participants.In contrast to the mandatory nature of broker co-investment,the voluntary involvement of internal employees in subscription may more effectively signal the company's performance and value to external investors.Accordingly,this paper investigates the impact of Employee Participation on both IPO pricing and the long-term performance of sci-tech innovation firms,focusing on executives and employees as strategic investors.Using STAR and GEM IPOs under the registration-based system as samples,this study finds that:First,companies that allow employee participation in strategic placement exhibit significantly higher IPO returns.This higher return phenomenon is attributable to a secondary market premium rather than primary market underpricing.In other words,Employee Participation elevates first-day returns by increasing the closing price,rather than lowering the issue price.Second,companies that allow employee participation in placement demonstrate superior post-IPO accounting and market performance,indicative of higher company quality.Further research suggests that the amount of placement obtained by employees has a varied impact on IPO pricing:compared with companies where employees do not participate in strategic placements,companies with lower employee placement tend to have lower primary market underpricing,while companies with higher placement tend to exhibit higher underpricing.A plausible explanation for this pattern is that companies with lower allocations implement Employee Participation primarily to convey positive signals,thereby boosting the issue price,whereas companies with higher allocations proactively lower the issue price to allow employees to share in the benefits of the listing.Overall,this study acknowledges the significance of Employee Participation in effectively improving pricing efficiency from signaling perspectives.The main contributions of this paper are as follows:First,it enriches the literature on how the registration-based reform optimizes IPO pricing.Previous studies have predominantly focused on the mandatory system design of registration-based reform in underwriting,trading mechanisms,and information disclosure,considering aspects such as investor expectations,trading liquidity,and information quality.However,this paper centers on the voluntary system innovation of employee strategic placements,providing empirical evidence for the positive effects of registration-based reform on improving IPO pricing efficiency.Second,this paper expands the literature on strategic placements.Diverging from existing literature that concentrates on the impact of overseas investors and intermediary institutions participating in strategic placements,this paper further extends its scope to the internal realm of IPO companies,scrutinizing the economic consequences of executives and core employees of the issuer acting as strategic investors.Third,it offers practical insights into how IPO companies can signal to the capital market through strategic placements under the registration-based system.In the aftermath of the registration system reform,the resurgence of market-oriented pricing mechanisms underscores the growing importance for issuers to signal positively to investors for fair valuation.The majority of existing co-investments are mandatory and struggle to fulfill signaling roles.The findings suggest that companies can transmit positive signals to both primary and secondary markets through the voluntary participation of employees in placements,providing new perspectives for the issuance strategy of IPO companies.Simultaneously,it offers enlightenment for regulatory authorities in further advancing and refining the registration-based system.