基于混合寡头垄断模型的碳排放交易机制社会福利分析

The Welfare Analysis in Emission Trading Schemes Based on a Mixed Oligopoly Approach

构建了基于混合寡头垄断模型的碳排放交易市场,分别计算了企业进入碳排放交易市场前后的均衡产量决策以及社会福利的变化情况,讨论了碳配额分配政策与社会福利之间的联系。研究结果表明在基于混合寡头模型的碳排放交易市场中,政府对碳配额分配政策做适当的优化可以在不损失环境有效性的前提下提高社会福利,推广了已有的一些成果,充实了混合双寡头垄断模型下碳排放交易体系中的社会福利分析,为政府产业政策的制定提供了理论依据。

This article constructs a carbon emissions trading market based on a mixed oligopoly model,and calculates the equilibrium output decisions and changes in social welfare for firms before and after entering the carbon emissions trading market.The relationship between carbon quota allocation policies and social welfare is discussed.Our main research results show that in the carbon emissions trading market based on the mixed oligopoly model,the government can improve social welfare without sacrificing environmental effectiveness by appropriately optimizing carbon quota allocation policies.The main results of this article extend some of the previous research findings and enrich the analysis of social welfare in the carbon emissions trading system under the mixed duopoly model,providing some theoretical basis for the formulation of government industrial policies.