摘要
黑格尔在《法哲学原理》第126节及127节的表述呈现黑格尔对“紧急避难权”(Notrecht)问题看似矛盾的态度。本文通过对这一矛盾背后黑格尔法权思想的分析,揭示了黑格尔所有权(Das Eigentum)思想中有一条根植于“承认”的理论线索:“所有权”作为自由的定在并不是无条件的,而是以承认的机制为基础,以人和人的关系为前提。从“承认”机制出发,我们发现黑格尔所描述的“所有权”中有一种特别的所有权,即人对自己肉身的所有权。肉身作为第一所有物具备其他所有物所不具备的“坚韧性质”,这是由黑格尔对人要占有自身的要求决定的。理解黑格尔整个法权思想中暗含的“为承认而斗争”的思想,才能融贯地理解黑格尔对“紧急避难权”的设置和他对于“所有权”作为自由定在的理论建构。黑格尔在其法哲学思想中以特别的紧急避难权与所有权思想容纳着一种对于为承认而斗争者同情的理解,使其具备了革命性的因素;而他通过对于斗争之法权的接纳,又将激进的诉求与断裂的可能性整合入了意识形态的和解进程当中。
In sections 126 and 127 of Philosophy of Right,Hegel presents an apparently contradictory attitude towards the problem of“Notrecht”.This paper reveals a theoretical clue rooted in“recognition”in Hegel’s theory of property rights.“Eigentum”as a free definition is not unconditional,but based on the mechanism of recognition and the premise of human relations.Starting from the mechanism of recognition,we find that there is a special kind of property right in Hegel’s description of“Eigentum”,that is,human ownership of their own flesh.As the first property,flesh has“tough properties”that other properties do not have,which is determined by Hegel’s requirement that people must own themselves.Only by understanding the idea of“struggling for recognition”implied in Hegel’s entire theory of law can we comprehensively understand his setting of“emergency shelter rights”and his theoretical construction of“property rights”as a free definition.In his philosophy of law,Hegel accommodates a sympathetic understanding of those who struggle for recognition through his special emergency shelter rights and property rights ideas,which endows it with revolutionary elements;through his acceptance of the law of struggle,he integrates radical demands and possibilities into the process of ideological reconciliation.
出处
《德国哲学》
2023年第2期111-145,304,共36页
Chinese Journal of German Philosophy