董事高管责任保险对企业漂绿行为的影响研究

Research on the Impact of Directors'and Executives'Liability Insurance to Enterprises'Faking Green Behavior

董事高管责任保险是一类重要的企业风险管理工具,也是外部保险机构参与公司治理的重要途径。以2010—2020年A股上市公司为研究样本,探究董责险对企业漂绿行为的影响和作用机制。研究发现:第一,上市公司购买董责险后,显著抑制了其漂绿程度;第二,上市公司的内部控制质量和外部投资者关注度,能在董责险和企业漂绿间起中介的作用;第三,董责险对具有不同产权性质和资产结构的企业漂绿抑制效果不同,对国有和固定资产占比高的企业更有效。鉴于董责险的积极效应,建议完善董事高管责任保险相关法律和制度,充分发挥其应有的公司治理功能。

Director and executive liability insurance(D&O)is an important tool of enterprise risk managemengt,and it is also an important way for external insurance institutions to participate in corporate governance.This article takes A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020 as research samples to explore the impact and mechanism of D&O on corporate'Faking Green Behavior'.Research has found that,firstly,the purchase of D&O by listed companies significantly suppresses their degree of greenness;Second,the level of internal control of listed companies and the attention of external investors have played a mesomeric effect between D&O and enterprises''Faking Green Behavior';Thirdly,the inhibition effect of D&O insurance on the'greenwashing'of enterprises with different property rights and asset structure is different,and more effective for state-owned and higher proportion of fixed assets.In view of the positive effect of D&O,it is suggested to improve the relevant laws and systems of D&O,and give full play to its due corporate governance function.