双碳背景下物流企业协同创新的演化博弈研究

Study on the Evolutionary Game Theory of Collaborative Innovation of Logistics Enterprises in the Context of Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality

基于演化博弈理论,构建政府引导、物流企业和学研机构共同参与的三方博弈模型。分析了三方在博弈过程中的不同策略选择,着重突出政府监管策略下的税收优惠与惩罚措施对三方演化博弈的影响;详细分析了在政府的高、中、低三种监管力度下,物流企业与学研机构做出合作或背叛的策略选择、演化走向及演化速率的不同;对政府及协同创新主体行为策略的演化过程以及影响因素进行仿真分析。研究表明,政府税收优惠力度和惩罚力度越高,物流企业和学研机构进行协同创新的概率越高;政府税收优惠力度和惩罚力度越低,物流企业和学研机构进行协同创新的概率越低。

This paper constructs a tripartite game model based on evolutionary game theory with the participation of government,logistics enterprises and research institutions.Firstly,it analyzes the different strategic choices of the three parties,highlighting the impact of tax incentives and penalties under the government's regulatory strategy.Then it analyzes the different strategic choices,evolutionary directions and evolutionary rates of cooperation or betrayal made by logistics enterprises and research institutes under the high,medium and low regulatory efforts of the government.Finally,it is analyzed that the evolution process of the behavioral strategies of the government and collaborative innovation subjects and the influencing factors.The results show that the greater the strength of the government tax incentives and penalties are,the higher the probability that logistics enterprises and research institutions will engage in collaborative innovation.And if the tax incentives and penalties are low,logistics enterprises and research institutions will not choose collaborative innovation.