微分博弈下的建筑碳减排研究

Research on Building Carbon Emission Reduction under Differential Game

随着低碳经济和环境意识的提高,相当多的学者关注并致力于减少建筑供应链内的碳排放。与此同时,消费者在建筑市场上对低碳建筑产品的偏好正在增加,放大了这些产品的潜在效益。本研究采用微分博弈模型研究建筑供应链成员之间的碳减排均衡策略,通过比较和分析集中和分散决策两种策略下的最优反馈平衡策略,可以得到,相对于分散决策,集中决策更有利于建筑碳减排。建筑碳减排的潜在收益越高,就越有利于降低建筑企业的碳排放,对实际碳排放控制有一定指导意义。

With the increasing awareness of low-carbon economy and environment,quite a number of scholars are concerned about and committed to reducing carbon emissions within the building supply chain.At the same time,consumer preference for low-carbon building products in the construction market is increasing,amplifying the potential benefits of these products.In this study,the differential game model is used to study the carbon emission reduction equilibrium strategy among members of the building supply chain.By comparing and analyzing the optimal feedback balance strategy under the two strategies of centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making,it can be concluded that compared with decentralized decision-making,centralized decision-making is more conducive to the carbon emission reduction of buildings.The higher the potential benefits of building carbon emission reduction,the more beneficial it is to reduce the carbon emissions of construction enterprises,so it has some guiding significance for the actual carbon emission control.