摘要
根据修订前的《公司法》规定,公司的监督权主要集中在监事会上,由监事会独立行使对公司董事和高级管理人员的监督权。但在公司治理的长期实践中,监事会作为监督机构不仅没有发挥其设立时所需发挥的作用,反而增加了公司治理成本。所以学界对监事会也一直存在争议,取消论、完善论讨论激烈。基于各种争议出台的新《公司法》对监督制度做出了大幅修改,该修订对公司在市场化的实践中选择符合自身发展的治理结构具有重大意义。本文通过对公司监督制度在新《公司法》修订前存在的问题及新《公司法》关于监督制度修订的主要内容进行分析,总结出公司在新《公司法》下完善监督制度的三种路径,从而帮助公司进一步强化自身监督管理,促进公司稳中向好的发展。
According to the provisions of the“Company Law”before the revision,the supervision power of the company is mainly concentrated on the supervisory board,which independently exercises supervision over the company’s directors and senior management.But in the long-term practice of corporate governance,the supervisory board,as a supervisory body,not only failed to play the role it needed to be established,but instead increased the cost of corporate governance.Therefore,there has been controversy over the board of supervisors in academia,and discussions on cancellation and perfection have been fierce.The new“Company Law”introduced on the basis of various disputes has made a major revision to the supervision system,which is of great significance to the company’s choice of governance structure in line with its own development.This paper analyzes the problems of the supervision system before the revision of the new“Company Law”and the main contents of the new“Company Law”to summarize three paths for the company,in order to help the company further strengthen its own management and improve the supervision system under the new“Company Law”.
作者
秦美虎
Meihu Qin(Namseoul University,Seoul Korea)
出处
《法学(汉斯)》
2024年第4期2388-2393,共6页
Open Journal of Legal Science
关键词
公司法
监督制度
监事会
Company Law
Supervisory System
Board of Supervisors