增加持续督导可以提升IPO公司信息披露质量吗?——来自断点回归的经验证据

Can Increasing Continuous Supervision Improve IPO Companies'Information Disclosure Quality?

信息披露质量对资本市场能否健康平稳运行至关重要。文章利用持续督导期限安排的自然实验,采用断点回归方法研究了保荐人持续督导时长与IPO公司上市后信息披露质量之间的关系。研究结果表明与控制组IPO公司相比,多接受约一年持续督导的处理组IPO公司上市后信息披露质量评级更高,应计盈余管理程度更低。上述研究为持续督导制度在提升IPO公司信息披露质量方面的有效性提供了经验证据,并且通过断点回归方法避免了内生性问题的困扰。文章结论为持续督导制度建设提供了有益启示,为注册制改革中放松政府管制,重视信息披露与证券服务中介作用的合理性提供了证据。

The quality of information disclosure is crucial to the healthy and stable operation of the capital market.This paper,utilizing a natural experiment based on the duration arrangement of continuous supervision,investigates the relationship between the duration of sponsor's continuous supervision and companies'information disclosure quality after going public through regression discontinuity design.The results show that the treatment group of IPO companies receiving more continuous supervision have higher information disclosure quality rating after listing,and the degree of accrued earnings management is lower.This paper provides empirical evidence for the effectiveness of continuous supervision in improving the quality of information disclosure for IPO companies,and avoids the endogenous problem through regression discontinuity design.The conclusion offers valuable insights for the construction of continuous supervision system and provides evidence for the rationality of relaxing government regulation and attaching importance to the role of capital market intermediaries and information disclosure during the reform process of registration system.