漂绿还是漂棕:非效率投资下的ESG漂洗倾向

Greenwashing or Brownwashing:The Tendency of ESG‑washing in the Context of Inefficient Investment

公司的投资效率与ESG绩效密切相关,从而可能诱发ESG漂洗行为。本文以合法性理论为基础,以2009—2022年的A股上市公司为样本,运用面板双向固定效应模型,探究了公司非效率投资对ESG报告漂洗的影响。研究发现:(1)投资不足的公司倾向于漂绿,然而,投资过度倾向于漂棕的结论不稳健;(2)投资不足对ESG报告漂绿的正向影响仅在股权制衡度较低、独立董事网络中心度较低、管理层货币薪酬较低以及管理层短视程度较高的公司中显著;(3)公司的盈利能力越强、全要素生产率越高、ESG基金持股比例越高以及分析师关注人数越多,都可以有效减轻投资不足对ESG漂绿的正向影响;(4)投资不足诱发ESG报告漂绿,公司声誉是其作用路径,融资约束是其深层动因,经济政策不确定性则是有效的外部制约机制。本文基于非效率投资的视角探究了公司投资活动对ESG报告披露的影响,弥补了现有文献在非效率投资的经济后果与ESG报告漂洗动机相关研究上的不足,为深入理解非效率投资对ESG报告披露质量的影响以及由此引发的信息不对称提供了经验证据,为政府与监管部门据此出台相关规定以抑制ESG漂绿提供了思路,也有利于推动上市公司更好地落实“两山论”、顺利实现“双碳”目标。

The legitimacy theory indicates that there is an implicit social contract between individual organizations and the society in which they operate,and companies generally gain social recognition through information disclosure.However,due to the non⁃mandatory or regulatory gaps in policies and regulations regarding ESG disclosure in many countries or regions,existing studies have shown that companies tend to protect their legitimacy in ESG by“decoupling”facts from disclosure,i.e“.ESG⁃washing”.ESG⁃washing includes“green⁃washing”and“brown⁃washing”.Green⁃washing occurs when companies choose to disclose a large amount of redundant ESG information,however,brown⁃washing occurs when companies choose to disclose ESG information less or more conservatively.ESG⁃washing behavior is not beneficial to the healthy development of ESG investment and hinders sustainable development process in China.Because ESG practice is a type of investment project,the degree of company’s inefficient investment exhibited in its investment activities will inevitably affect its performance,which inducing information disclosure manipulation behavior targeting non⁃financial performance.To explore the impact of inefficient investment on ESG⁃washing in ESG reports,based on the legitimacy theory,this paper uses A⁃share listed companies from 2009 to 2022 as a sample and panel fixed effects model as a research method.As for variables measurement,this paper assesses the extent of ESG⁃washing by using the difference between industry⁃adjusted Bloomberg disclosure scores and Huazheng ESG performance ratings.In other words,the obtained measure reflects the industry⁃relative degree of ESG⁃washing,and express it in GW.If GW is greater than 0,it implies that the company exhibits a green⁃washing behavior compared to other companies in the industry.If GW is less than 0,it means the company demonstrates brown⁃washing behavior compared to other companies in the industry.If GW equals 0,it signifies that the company neither engages in green⁃washing nor brown⁃washing relative to other companies in the industry.Additionally,it uses the Richardson investment efficiency model to measure the degree of inefficient investment.The results are as follows:(1)Companies with insufficient investment tend to green⁃wash ESG reports.This conclusion still holds after using methods such as propensity score matching method,Heckman two⁃stage regression,instrumental variable method,replacing the ESG⁃washing measurement and regression models to alleviate endogeneity issues.However,the conclusion that‘companies with excessive investment tends to brown⁃wash ESG reports’lacks robustness.(2)Insufficient investment only significantly enhances the positive impact of green⁃washing in companies with lower equity balance,lower centrality in the independent directors’network,lower executive monetary compensation,and higher managerial short⁃sightedness.(3)The stronger the profitability,the higher the total factor productivity,the greater the proportion of ESG funds held,and the higher the number of analysts’coverage,the more effectively it can mitigate the positive impact of insufficient investment on green⁃washing in ESG reports(.4)Corporate reputation is the pathway through which insufficient investment triggers the green⁃washing in ESG reports.Financing constraints are the deep⁃seated driving force behind underinvestment and resulting in greenwashing.And economic policy uncertainty serves as an effective external constraint mechanism.This paper explores the impact of corporate investment activities on ESG reports disclosure from the perspective of inefficient investment,and conducts empirical analysis on its moderating mechanism,intermediary mechanism,underlying drivers and external constraint mechanism.Firstly,it compensates for the shortcomings of existing literature on the economic consequences of inefficient investment and the ESG⁃washing motivation.Secondly,it provides empirical evidence for a deeper understanding of the impact of inefficient investment on the quality of non⁃financial performance reports disclosure and the information asymmetry caused by inefficient investment.And it also provides ideas for the government and regulatory authorities to introduce relevant regulations based on this to suppress green⁃washing.Last but not least,this paper is also beneficial for promoting listed companies to better implement the Two Mountains Theory and achieve the“carbon peaking and carbon neutrality”goals faster.What’s more,it also provides reference for further enhancing investors’risk awareness and improving the quality of ESG information disclosure by listed companies.