双层平衡模式下药品专利反向支付协议的反垄断法规制

Antitrust Law Regulation on Reverse Payment Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent under Two-tier Equilibrium Model

我国反垄断法补救受害人损失的途径有执法中没收违法所得隐含的“退赔”与反垄断损害赔偿诉讼,但实践中却面临着没收违法所得同时责令退赔的适用率极低、企业自动退赔罕见、反垄断损害赔偿诉讼成功率不高的困境,难以对受害人损失进行有效补救。通过反垄断执法补救受害人损失是“响应式重塑”理念应用于反垄断领域的直接体现。域外执法机构补救受害人损失的方式中,通过减少罚款激励违法企业自愿赔偿的英国方案,最具制度优越性与借鉴价值。为了破解我国受害人损失无法有效补救的困境,应将“响应式重塑”作为反垄断执法的核心理念,完善反垄断法规定,确保执法机构采取责令退赔的合法性,构建我国的企业自愿赔偿制度,并通过调整反垄断处罚结构和建立自愿赔偿监督受托人制度,实现企业自愿赔偿与罚款的捆绑使用,以提升企业自愿赔偿方案适用率,使受损害的民事主体能依法获得合理补偿。

The reverse payment settlement mainly consists of interest transfer clause and restriction clause,which have both positive and negative effects.Legal reverse payment settlement can realize the unity of the private interests of patentee and effective competition public interest,while illegal reverse payment settlement has competitive harm.The reverse payment settlement should be examined for illegality under the two-tier equilibrium model established by the Antitrust Law in China.In practice,it is necessary to distinguish whether reverse payment settlement constitutes monopoly agreement and whether monopoly agreement can be exempted so as to balance the internal competitive efforts as well as efforts between internal competition and external policy interests.The review of monopoly agreements is subject to quick look rule.When the defendant is unable to validly refute the basic facts proved by the plaintiff through the competitive effect defense,the reverse payment settlement constitutes a monopoly agreement.Exemption from monopoly agreements can be defended in the policy interest by invoking the exemption clause.In practice,it is necessary to restrict the reverse payment settlement when the competitive harm cannot be exempted and protect it when the illegal defense is established.