基于演化博弈分析的政府投资项目造价管控研究

Research on Cost Management and Control of Government-invested Projects Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

财政资金使用效益不高是政府投资项目管理中的一个重要难题,而全过程造价管理有助于这一难题的解决。构建了包含政府、建设方、全过程造价咨询方的三方演化博弈模型,探寻了三方主体动态博弈演变路径,分析了各方行为策略的渐进稳定条件。研究发现,政府奖惩对提升建设方管控积极性具有重要意义;建设方增强奖惩力度、声誉影响有助于促进全过程造价咨询方提升服务水平;为实现三方最优策略均衡,政府对建设方的监管可采用以处罚为主、奖励为辅,建设方对全过程造价咨询方的管理可采用以激励为主、惩戒为辅。并利用Matlab对模型中关键影响因素进行了仿真分析,表明了研究结论的合理性。

Improving the efficiency of financial fund utilization in the management of government-invested projects represents a significant challenge.The entire process cost management contributes to the solution of this challenge.This research developed a tripartite evolutionary game model,which included the government,owner,and the whole process cost consultant.The model explored the evolution path of the tripartite dynamic game and analyzed the gradual and stable condition of the behavioral strategies of all parties.The findings of the research indicate that the government's rewards and punishments have a positive impact on encouraging the participation of the owner in project management and control.Furthermore,the owner's rewards and punishments have a significant effect on improving the service level of the whole process cost consultant.To achieve optimal strategic balance among the three parties,the government's strategy of punishment is dominant in its supervision of owners,while the strategy of reward is secondary.Similarly,the owner's strategy of incentives is dominant in its management of the whole process cost consultant,while the strategy of punishment is secondary.The results of the simulation conducted using Matlab software demonstrate the rationality of the research conclusions.