摘要
1928年,海德格尔正在寻找一种新的形而上学,他称之为“此在形而上学”。此在形而上学包括两个部分,即基础存在论和元存在论。从此在形而上学出发,海德格尔用“渴求”(Drang)来解释莱布尼茨的单子思想。他提出了一种有关时间性的渴求的元存在论。根据这种元存在论,对世界的哲学理解是由人类欲望及其在实际性中的锚定状态所刻画的,而实际性的特征是身体性、性和血统、历史性、空间性以及与他人的共在。而在1955—1956年的弗莱堡讲授课中,海德格尔将莱布尼茨看作关于作为存在神学的形而上学的思想家。海德格尔试图超越莱布尼茨和作为存在神学的形而上学。在比较了海德格尔的两次莱布尼茨阐释之后可以发现,海德格尔在1955—1956年的道路过于极端。1928年的此在形而上学并不能归入海德格尔在1955—1956年批判的“存在神逻辑学”形而上学,它具有特殊的哲学价值。
In 1928,Heidegger was searching for a new kind of metaphysics that he called the metaphysics of Dasein.The metaphysics of Dasein has two parts,fundamental ontology and metontology.Heidegger interprets Leibniz’s idea of Drang from the metaphysics of Dasein.He sketches out a metontology of the temporal Drang.According to this metontology,the philosophical understanding of the world is characterized by human desire and it is being anchored in a facticity marked by its bodiliness,its sexuality and lineage,its historicity,spatiality and its being-with-one-another.In the Freiburg Lecture Course of 1955-1956,Leibniz became a thinker of metaphysics as ontotheology.Heidegger tries to transcend Leibnitz and metaphysics as ontotheology.This paper compares Heidegger’s two interpretations of Leibniz and reveals that the way from 1955 to 1956 is too radical.The metaphysics of Dasein in 1928 cannot be subsumed under the“onto-theo-logical”metaphysics that Heidegger criticised in 1955-56.It has particular philosophical value.
作者
INGA Romer(Department of Philosophy,University of Freiburg,Freiburg 79098,Germany)
出处
《同济大学学报(社会科学版)》
北大核心
2024年第3期1-8,共8页
Journal of Tongji University:Social Science Edition