摘要
针对医用应急物资需求的特点,从政府监管、公众监督和医药企业储备三方联动视角研究突发公共事件中的医用应急物资储备策略,构建应急物资储备三方演化博弈模型,分析演化博弈系统中各均衡点及其稳定性条件,探讨各个参与主体的策略选择的动态演化过程,并对部分参数进行数值仿真。结果表明:政府监管和公众监督存在互补关系,加入公众监督,可以更好地约束企业的行为,且适当的惩罚和奖励可以提高医药企业储备和公众监督行为的意愿。
According to the characteristics of medical emergency materials demand,the strategy of medical emergency materials reserve in public emergencies was studied from the perspective of government supervision,public supervision and pharmaceutical enterprise reserve.This paper built a tripartite evolutionary game model for emergency materials reserve,analyzed the equilibrium points and their stability conditions in the evolutionary game system,discussed the dynamic evolution process of the strategy selection of each participant,and carried out numerical simulation of some parameters.The results show that there is a complementary relationship between government supervision and public supervision,adding public supervision can better constrain the behavior of enterprises,and appropriate punishment and reward can improve the willingness of pharmaceutical enterprises to reserve and public supervision behavior.
作者
尹婧
江雨燕
甘如美江
汪正
王付宇
YIN Jing;JIANG Yuyan;GAN Rumeijiang;WANG Zheng;WANG Fuyu(School of Management Science and Engineering,Anhui University of Technology,Maanshan 243032,China;不详)
出处
《武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版)》
CAS
2024年第3期357-361,共5页
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Information & Management Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71872002,72274001)
安徽省高校人文社科研究重大项目(SK2020ZD16)
复杂系统多学科管理与控制安徽省教育厅重点实验室开放课题项目(CS2022-ZD02,CS2023-ZD02)。
关键词
突发公共事件
医用应急物资
三方演化博弈
政企合作
数值仿真
public emergency
medical emergency supplies
tripartite evolutionary game
cooperation between government and enterprise
numerical simulation