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基于演化博弈的反转网络舆情多阶段治理研究

Research on Multi-stage Governance of Reverse Network Public Opinion Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
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摘要 为分析反转网络舆情演化的内在机理和影响因素,得到最优策略,结合反转舆情形成期、扩散期和反转期三阶段的现实特征,分别构建有限理性个体策略选择的演化博弈模型。通过求解不同阶段的演化均衡解,并根据利益相关关系进行数值仿真,分析决策成本、奖惩机制与主体合作这3个主要因素对舆情演化的影响。研究表明:在形成期最优治理状态为{全面爆料,不传播},增加知情者爆料成本和公众传播成本能够从源头减少反转;在扩散期最优治理状态为{追随自媒体,全面报道,松弛监管},权威机构增强奖惩力度特别是惩罚能够有效促使自媒体全面报道;在反转期最优治理状态为{相信反转,推动反转,积极},同时自媒体与权威机构配合传播真相有助于反转舆情治理和迅速趋于稳定。 In order to analyze the internal mechanism and influencing factors of the evolution of reverse network public opinion,and obtain the optimal strategy,combined with the realistic characteristics of the three stages of the formation period,diffusion period and reversal period of reverse public opinion,the evolutionary game models of limited rational individual strategy selection were constructed respectively.By solving the evolutionary equilibrium solutions at different stages and performing numerical simulations based on the stakeholder relationships,the influence on the evolution of public opinion was analyzed from the perspectives of decision-making cost,reward and punishment mechanism,and cooperation of subjects.It is found that the optimal governance state in the formation period is{comprehensively report,do not spread},and increasing the cost of informing people and the cost of public dissemination can reduce the reversal at the source;the optimal governance state in the diffusion period is{follow the self-media,comprehensively report,and loosen the regulation},and increasing the incentives and punishments by authoritative organizations,especially the punishment,can effectively motivate self-media to comprehensively report.In the reversal period,the optimal governance state is{believe in the reversal,promote the reversal,positive},and the cooperation between the self-media and the authoritative organization in spreading the truth can help the governance of the reversal public opinion and stabilize it quickly.
作者 江长斌 徐思思 李汾萦 黄英辉 徐紫琪 詹若贤 JIANG Changbin;XU Sisi;LI Fenying;HUANG Yinghui;XU Ziqi;ZHAN Ruoxian(School of Management,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China;不详)
出处 《武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版)》 CAS 2024年第3期392-401,共10页 Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Information & Management Engineering
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(19BSH013)。
关键词 演化博弈 反转网络舆情 多阶段 仿真分析 舆情治理 evolutionary game reverse network public opinion multi-stage simulation analysis governance of public opinion
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