消费者风险厌恶的运费险分担机制与供应链定价研究

Research on Freight Insurance Sharing Mechanism and Supply Chain Pricing with Consumer Risk Aversion

考虑消费者的退货行为、风险厌恶态度和运费险价值敏感,建立零售商承担、消费者承担、零售商与消费者共同承担、零售商与制造商共同承担4种不同运费险承担方式的Stackelberg价格博弈模型,研究供应链的定价决策和在线零售商的最优退货运费险策略。研究表明:低退货率和高运费险敏感性有助于提高供应链的整体利润;低退货率时,在线零售商主动为消费者购买运费险优于消费者自行购买;运费险的分担机制不能实现供应链协调。

Taking into account consumers′return behavior,risk aversion attitude and sensitivity to freight insurance value,the Stackelberg price game models under four different freight insurance sharing mode,namely retailer,consumer,retailer and consumer,retailer and manufacturer,are established to investigate pricing decisions of supply chain and the optimal return freight insurance strategy of the online retailer.The results show that low return rate and high freight insurance sensitivity can improve the overall profit of supply chain.When the return rate is low,the online retailer takes the initiative to buy freight insurance for consumers,is better than that letting the consumers buy it themselves.Freight insurance sharing mechanism cannot achieve supply chain coordination.