双向蔑视、非优策略选择与危机僵局

Bidirectional Disrespect,Non-Optimal Strategical Choice and the Formation of Crisis Impasse

当国际危机成为危机发起方追求既定目标的手段时,理性的国家领导人通常倾向于避免投入过多成本并希望尽快结束危机。但是,作为实现自身目标手段的危机在令双方持续遭受非必要损失的前提下,两国的决策者并未迅速结束危机,相反却使危机陷入久拖不决的僵局。传统信号博弈理论因其理想化的理性行为体假定而难以有效回答上述问题,政治心理路径在解释该问题时也缺乏对因果机制的梳理。由于蔑视因素是危机陷入僵局的深层原因,作者通过将蔑视因素引入传统信号博弈理论,提出了有限理性信号博弈模型,认为危机中的一方对另一方采取的蔑视行为会诱发后者领导人及其国内民众的错误知觉与愤怒情绪,继而导致该国领导人的非理性选择,致使危机双方领导人在决策时背离结束危机的最优解而选择非优策略,最终使危机陷入僵局。伊朗人质危机案例验证了有限理性信号博弈模型对危机陷入僵局的理论解释力。

When some international crises are used as a means for initiators,rational leaders are supposed to tend to avoid costing too much,and hope to end the crises as soon as possible.Such crises are originally just conceived as a means to achieve the leaders'primary goals.While these kinds of crises cause continuous and unnecessary losses to both sides,rational leaders do not end them quickly and then the crisis may escalate into the next stage of over-prolonged stalemates.The traditional signaling game theory's explanation to the puzzle above is limited due to its idealized rational behavior assumption,and the political psychological approach also lacks a specific causal mechanism.Since the disrespect factor is a deep motivator of such crises,the authors propose a bounded rationality signaling game model by introducing the disrespect factor into traditional signaling game theory.It suggests that the disrespectful behavior towards each other during a crisis could generate misperceptions and emotions of both the leaders and the public,and then trigger irrational choices among the leaders.Finally,both sides may deviate from the optimal solution that could end the crisis,and choose a non-optimal strategy,which ultimately falls into an unintended impasse situation.As a case study,the Iran hostage crisis validates the theoretical explanatory power of the bounded rationality signaling game model through analyzing the formation of crisis impasse.