管理者过度自信与审计师应对——基于关键审计事项披露视角

Management Overconfidence and Auditors'Response:Evidence from the Disclosure of Key Audit Matters

本文以2016—2021年我国A股上市公司披露的关键审计事项为研究样本,考察管理者过度自信对关键审计事项披露决策的影响。研究发现,当客户公司有过度自信的管理者时,审计师披露的关键审计事项数量更多,特质信息含量更高。机制检验表明,过度自信的管理者对关键审计事项风险的低估与审计师对过度自信管理者增加审计风险的担忧共同促进了关键审计事项充分性和信息含量的提高。进一步研究发现,这一促进作用主要体现在管理者能力欠缺的样本中,能力低且过度自信的管理者强化了审计师通过关键审计事项进行免责的需求,且审计师会为应对管理者过度自信而增加的审计投入要求更高的费用补偿。本文立足于审计师与管理者双方博弈中的不同需求和决策逻辑,从管理者个人特征的角度丰富了关键审计事项的影响因素的研究,并有助于重新认识管理者过度自信这一心理偏差对审计决策的影响。

This paper examines the effects of management overconfidence on the disclosure decisions of key audit matters(KAMs)by using KAMs data of A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2021 in China.We find that management overconfidence significantly affects the disclosure of KAMs,which is reflected in reporting a higher number of KAMs and a higher level of idiosyncratic information content of KAMs.Mechanism analysis shows that the underestimation of KAMs'risk by overconfident managers and the auditor's concern about increased audit risk by overconfident managers combine to promote the adequacy and information content of KAMs.Further analysis shows that the above effect is more significant in firms with poor management competence,suggesting that low competence and overconfident managers reinforce the auditors'demand for disclaimers through KAMs.Moreover,auditors will demand higher audit fees to compensate for their additional effort of the overconfident managers.Based on the different needs and decision-making logics in the game between auditors and managers,this paper enriches the literature on the factors influencing the disclosure of KAMs from the perspective of managers'personal characteristics,and contributes to rerecognize the effect of management overconfidence on audit decisions.