摘要
近年来,扼杀式并购日渐演变为众多数字平台扩增市场力量,排除、限制竞争的终南捷径。这种短期内不影响市场结构的并购活动虽具有合法的交易外观,但却潜藏着深远的消极影响,其不仅会扰乱公平公正的市场竞争秩序,给企业创新带来双向阻碍,还会对消费者福利造成实质性减损。现阶段,我国数字经济领域的法律尚未与数字平台发展同频,数字平台扼杀式并购的反垄断规制仍存在一些不足。譬如,以营业额为标准的事前审查申报制度过于单薄;传统方案中数字平台相关市场界定困难;现有举证责任分配有失妥当;事后监管疲软乏力。为促使我国数字经济高质量发展,破解数字平台扼杀式并购的反垄断规制困境,可考虑将交易额纳入事前申报门槛,适度借鉴国外“守门人”制度,合理调适数字平台并购交易的举证责任,增设事后观察期制度,营造更加和谐、有序、公平、公正的数字法治生态。
In recent years,killer acquisitions have increasingly evolved into the ultimate shortcut for many digital platforms to expand their market power and exclude and restrict competition.Although this kind of mergers and acquisitions activities that does not affect the market structure in the short term has a legal transaction appearance,it lurks in the far-reaching negative impact,which will not only disturb the fair and equitable order of market competition,bring obstacles to enterprise innovation,but also cause substantial impairment to consumer welfare.At this stage,the laws in the field of digital economy in China have not yet resonated with the development of digital platforms,and there are still some deficiencies in the anti-monopoly regulation of killer acquisitions on digital platforms.For example,the ex-ante review and declaration system based on the standard of turnover is too simple,it is difficult to define the market related to digital platforms in the traditional solutions,the existing allocation of the burden of proof is inappropriate,and the ex-post supervision is weak and ineffective.In order to promote the high-quality development of China's digital economy and solve the antitrust regulatory dilemma of killer acquisitions on digital platforms,we can consider incorporating the transaction amount into the threshold of ex-ante declaration,moderately learning from the “gatekeeper” system of foreign countries,reasonably adapting the burden of proof for the merger and acquisition transactions of digital platforms and adding an ex-post observation period system,so as to create a more harmonious,orderly,fair and just digital rule of law ecology.
作者
张爽
Zhang Shuang(School of Criminal Law,East China University of Political Science and Law,Shanghai 200042,China;Institute of Intellectual Property,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei Anhui 230026,China)
出处
《河北经贸大学学报》
北大核心
2024年第4期60-72,共13页
Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business
关键词
数字平台
扼杀式并购
反垄断
经营者集中
初创企业
推定违法制度
digital platforms
killer acquisitions
antitrust
operator concentration
start-ups
presumption of delinquency system