债权人治理与企业避税——基于主贷银行上市的准实验研究

Creditor Governance and Tax Avoidance-A Quasi——experiment Study based on the Main Bank's IPO

债权人能否影响企业的避税行为是一个重要但尚未深入研究的问题。本文运用银行上市行为衡量银行债权治理强度的变化,考察主贷银行上市对其客户企业避税程度的影响。研究发现,主贷银行上市后,其客户企业的避税程度显著下降,这表明银行债权治理机制能够有效约束客户企业的避税行为。机制检验结果显示,主贷银行上市对避税行为的抑制作用主要体现在偿债能力较弱、信息披露质量较差和非国有产权的客户企业中。本文的研究结论表明,银行上市有助于强化银行对客户风险性行为的监督,即银行上市提升了债权治理机制的有效性。这为评价我国银行业改革取得的成效提供了新的证据,也为进一步扩大银行业对外开放、深化金融供给侧结构性改革提供政策参考。

Whether creditors affect corporate tax avoidance is an important issue that has not been studied in depth.Using the bank's IPO event to measure the change of the bank credit governance intensity,we explore the issue with the DID methodology.Evidence shows that the firm's tax avoidance degree decreases significantly after its main bank goes public,which indicates that the bank's credit governance mechanism can effectively restrain corporate tax avoidance.Further evidence suggests that the restrictive effect is more pronounced in firms with weaker solvency,lower information disclosure quality,or non-state-owned property right.Our findings add to the studies of tax avoidance factors and the economic consequence of creditor governance.The conclusion shows that bank's IPO could help strengthen the supervision of corporate risky behavior,that is,the bank's IPO could improve the effectiveness of creditor's governance mechanism,which provides an important policy reference for the further deepening of the financial industry reform.