政府监管机制下港口企业的社会责任履行研究

Study on the Social Responsibility Fulfillment of Port Enterprises Under Government Regulatory Mechanism

为探究政府监管机制对港口企业履行社会责任的影响,分别构建了不同监管机制下地方政府与港口企业的演化博弈模型,并进行数值仿真分析。研究表明:在静态惩罚、奖惩监管机制下,双方不存在演化稳定策略。在动态惩罚、奖惩监管机制下,双方能够达成唯一演化稳定策略。政府动态惩罚监管机制要优于动态奖惩监管机制。此时,惩罚最高力度和政府监管成本会影响港口企业履行CSR概率的大小。为地方政府促进港口企业履行CSR提供了相应建议。

In order to investigate the influence of government regulatory mechanisms on the fulfillment of social responsibility by port enterprises,the evolutionary game models of local governments and port enterprises under different regulatory mechanisms are constructed and numerical simulations are conducted respectively.The study shows that there is no evolutionary stability strategy between the two parties under the static punishment,reward and punishment regulatory mechanism.Under the dynamic punishment,reward and punishment regulation mechanism,both parties can reach the only evolutionary stability strategy.The government′s dynamic punishment regulation mechanism is better than the dynamic reward and punishment regulation mechanism.In this case,the maximum strength of punishment and the cost of government regulation affect the probability of port enterprises to fulfill CSR.Corresponding suggestions are provided for local governments to promote the fulfillment of CSR by port enterprises.