信息不对称下新产品研发的合同设计

The Contract Design of New Product R&D Under Information Asymmetry

假设企业研发一种新产品,其研发成功的时间具有不确定性.文章运用实物期权方法和委托代理理论,分析信息不对称下新产品研发的合同设计问题,得到了最优合同的显式解.在此基础上,文章进一步分析了信息不对称对委托人价值、新产品研发的退出时机的影响.研究结果表明,信息不对称减少了委托人的价值,使得高成本的新产品的研发退出时机提前;新产品研发成功的平均时间越短,委托人的价值越大.

Assume that the enterprise initiates a project to develop a new product,and that the R&D cycle is uncertain.Under information asymmetry,the real option method and principal-agent theory are used to develop the optimal contract for this project.The optimal contract is obtained in closed form.On this basis,the effect of information asymmetry on the principal's value and the optimal exit timing of R&D are also analyzed.Our results show that,with information asymmetry,the principal's value decreases and the exit timing of high-cost R&D is advanced.The shorter the R&D cycle,the greater the value of the principal.