风险柔性约束下非对称过度自信的基金管理者的激励研究

Incentive Research on Asymmetric Overconfident Fund Managers Under Flexible Risk Constraints

将投资收益风险约束引入基金管理者报酬合同,研究风险柔性约束下非对称过度自信的基金管理者的激励问题.研究表明,管理者的过度自信能促进其自身的努力,推高基金风险资产的投资比例.受风险柔性约束的管理者努力的边际成本及其努力水平均小于无风险约束时的情况.收益分享比例和风险柔性约束系数必须满足一定的条件,线性合同才能激励管理者付出努力.委托人过度自信通过正向影响收益分享比例,进而促进管理者努力,适度的委托人过度自信通过负向影响收益风险约束系数,进而促进管理者努力.因此,委托人适度的过度自信有利于激励管理者的努力.委托人的过度自信水平不宜过高.

This paper introduces investment return risk constraint into fund manager compensation contract,and studies the incentive problem of asymmetric overconfident fund manager under flexible risk constraint.Research shows that managers'overconfidence can boost their own efforts and push up the proportion of funds invested in risky assets.The marginal cost and effort level of managers with flexible risk constraints are smaller than those without risk constraints.Profit sharing ratio and risk flexibility constraint coefficient must meet certain conditions,so that linear contracts can motivate managers to make efforts.Principals'overconfidence positively affects the ratio of revenue sharing,thus promoting managers'efforts,while moderate principals'overconfidence negatively affects the risk constraint coefficient of revenue,thus promoting managers'efforts.Therefore,the moderate overconfidence of the principal is conducive to motivating the efforts of the manager.The clients'level of overconfidence should not be too high.